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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
With one exception, the answer to the question in the title is "no."
To use such nonlegislative documents to bind the public violates the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA) and dishonors our system of limited
government. This is true whether the agency attempts to bind the public
as a legal matter or as a practical matter.I An agency may not make
binding law except in accordance with the authorities and procedures
established by Congress. To make binding law through actions in the
nature of rulemaking, the agency must use legislative rules, which ordi-
narily must be made in accordance with the notice-and-comment proce-
dures specified by section 553 of the APA. 2
1. An agency rule is "binding" when the agency treats it as dispositive of the issue it addresses.
A document that was not issued legislatively, and which therefore cannot be binding legally, is
nevertheless binding as a practical matter if the agency treats it as dispositive of the issue it ad-
dresses. See infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
2. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988); see Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-03 (1979); Batterton
v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Advance notice and public participation are re-
quired for those actions that carry the force of law."). An agency may make law through adjudica-
tion, as contrasted with rulemaking, without complying with § 553 procedures or otherwise
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The sole category of exceptions-where an agency may permissibly
attempt to make a substantive nonlegislative rulemaking document bind-
ing on private parties-is for interpretive rules.3 These are rules that
interpret statutory language which has some tangible meaning, rather
than empty or vague language like "fair and equitable" or "in the public
interest."'4 An agency may nonlegislatively announce or act upon an in-
terpretation that it intends to enforce in a binding way, so long as it stays
within the fair intendment of the statute and does not add substantive
content of its own.5 Because Congress has already acted legislatively, the
agency need not exercise its own delegated legislative authority. Its at-
tempts to enforce an interpretation can be viewed as simply implement-
ing existing positive law previously laid down by Congress. As a
observing the requirements for making legislative rules. See infra text accompanying notes 33-36
and 41-48. This Article is not concerned with the law made by adjudication. That the two styles of
lawmaking are governed by widely different procedural requirements (strict for rules but loose for
adjudications) is an anomaly created by Congress when it enacted § 553 and confirmed by the
Supreme Court in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394
U.S. 759 (1969), and NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
3. Legislative rules made pursuant to specific exemptions in § 553, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 51-54, do not supply additional exceptions to the statements in the text about nonlegislative
documents. The exemptions in § 553 relieve the agency of having to follow that section's notice-and-
comment procedures, but they do not relieve the agency of the need, if its rule is to be binding, to
satisfy other requirements of legislative rulemaking. See infra text accompanying notes 41-48. Even
on a subject as to which its legislative rules would come within § 553's exemption from notice-and-
comment procedure, the agency may not use a nonlegislative document to bind the public, unless
that document is an interpretive rule.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 56-68.
5. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045-46 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (differentiat-
ing "cases in which an agency is merely explicating Congress' desires from those cases in which the
agency is adding substantive content of its own," and speaking of a "classic example of an agency
rule held not to be interpretative-thus requiring notice and comment as a prerequisite to validity")
and authorities cited therein. "The function of § 553's first exception, that for 'interpretive rules,' is
to allow agencies to explain ambiguous terms in legislative enactments without having to undertake
cumbersome proceedings." Id. at 1045; see also Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1308 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) ("[A]s a general rule, an agency can declare its understanding of what a statute requires
without providing notice and comment, but an agency cannot go beyond the text of a statute and
exercise its delegated powers without first providing adequate notice and comment."); United Tech-
nologies Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[Tlhese cases show that what distin-
guishes interpretative from legislative rules is the legal base upon which the rule rests. If the rule is
based on specific statutory provisions, and its validity stands or falls on the correctness of the
agency's interpretation of those provisions, it is an interpretative rule. If, however, the rule is based
on an agency's power to exercise its judgment as to how best to implement a general statutory
mandate, the rule is likely a legislative one."); American Postal Workers Union v. United States
Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 559-60 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("As an interpretative rule, the new annuity
computation formula is exempt from the rulemaking requirements of the APA, and OPM therefore
did not act unlawfully in promulgating it without notice and comment proceedings."), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1100 (1984); see also cases cited infra note 366.
It is clich6 to observe that these distinctions are sometimes difficult to draw. That makes them
none the less indispensable to the analysis needed to identify unauthorized attempts to fasten binding
norms upon the public.
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practical matter, the agency in this way gives the interpretation a binding
effect.6 The same is true where the agency interprets its own previously
promulgated legislative rules.
By contrast, when it does not merely interpret, but sets forth onto
new substantive ground through rules that it will make binding, the
agency must observe the legislative processes laid down by Congress. 7
That is, when an agency uses rules to set forth new policies that will bind
the public, it must promulgate them in the form of legislative rules. The
statutory procedures for developing legislative rules serve values that
have deep importance for a fair and effective administrative process and
indeed for the maintenance of a democratic system of limited
government.8
6. By declaring that the given interpretation is the one it will apply, or by basing enforcement
action upon it, or by routinely applying it to pass upon applications, the agency binds the affected
private parties as a practical matter, see infra text accompanying notes 79-89 and 366-68, at least
until a court disapproves the interpretation. The agency treats the interpretation as dispositive of the
question involved, and private parties can ignore it only at their peril. The private parties are thus
bound practically even though the nonlegislatively promulgated interpretation does not legally bind
them: An agency interpretation does not bind the courts and does not of its own force bind the
public unless it has been embodied in a legislative rule or other action carrying the force of law, as a
court is free to arrive at a different interpretation. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct.
1227, 1235-36 (1991); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); Morton v. Ruiz, 415
U.S. 199 (1974); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Metropolitan School Dist. of Wayne
Township v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 493 (7th Cir. 1992); Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpre-
tations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REr. 1, 3 n.6, 39 (1990); infra note 366.
7. Administrative Procedure Act, § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281, 303 (1979); American Hosp. Ass'n, 834 F.2d at 1044-46. In addition to those of the APA,
other statutory requirements may specify the legislative rulemaking procedures in particular areas.
E g., 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1988) (Federal Trade Commission); 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (1988) (Department of
Education).
The APA § 553 requirements, often called "notice-and-comment" procedures, call for publica-
tion of notice of the proposed rulemaking (including notice of any public proceedings, of the legal
authority under which the rules are proposed, and of the terms of the proposal or the subjects and
issues involved); opportunity for all interested persons to comment through submission of written
views, with or without opportunity for oral presentation; consideration of the matter presented; and
publication of the rules, including a concise statement of their basis and purpose, in the Federal
Register. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1).
Section 553 provides exemptions from these requirements for "interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, [and] rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice," id. § 553(b)(A),
and when the agency "for good cause" finds "that notice and public procedure thereon are impracti-
cable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest," id. § 553(b)(B). The exemptions for interpre-
tive rules and policy statements are central topics of this Article.
In their adjudicatory opinions, agencies often announce the propositions of law or policy that
formed the basis of their decisions. These propositions are not treated as rules by the APA, and are
not governed by the statement in the text. See infra text accompanying notes 31-36. Nor are non-
substantive rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice governed by the statement in the
text. See infra text accompanying notes 53-54.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 356-58.
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Except to the extent that they interpret specific statutory or regula-
tory language, then, nonlegislative rules like policy statements, guidances,
manuals and memoranda should not be used to bind the public.9 While
these nonlegislative rules by definition cannot legally bind, agencies often
inappropriately issue them with the intent or effect of imposing a practi-
cal binding norm upon the regulated or benefited public. Such use of
nonlegislative policy documents is the capital problem addressed by this
Article.
Thus, under the taxonomy of the APA,10 a rulemaking action that
the agency wishes to make binding upon affected persons must be either a
legislative rule (which binds legally) or an interpretive rule (which may
bind practically). All other substantive rulemaking documents-such as
policy statements, guidances, manuals, circulars, memoranda, bulletins,
and the like-are in APA terminology "policy statements,"11 which the
agency is not entitled to make binding, either as a legal matter or as a
practical matter. These issuances will sometimes be referred to as "non-
legislative policy documents" or "policy documents."
This Article accordingly will advance the general recommendation,
based on the APA, that agencies observe legislative rulemaking proce-
dures for any action in the nature of rulemaking that is intended to im-
pose mandatory obligations or standards upon private parties, or that has
that effect. To the extent that agency pronouncements interpret specific
statutory or regulatory language, this general recommendation does not
apply. But the Article will separately recommend that interpretations
that substantially enlarge the jurisdiction exercised by the agency, or sub-
stantially change the obligations or entitlements of private parties, should
nevertheless be promulgated by legislative rulemaking procedures as a
matter of sound agency practice.12
9. All documents and actions like these are "rules" within the APA definition, 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(4) (1988), and also are "policy statements" within the APA's taxonomy, as explicated below,
infra text accompanying notes 65-70. "'[R]ule' means the whole or a part of an agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law
or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency ...... 5
U.S.C. § 551(4). The definition thus includes documents and actions that do not have the force of
law (nonlegislative rules) as well as those that do (legislative rules). The "agency process for formu-
lating, amending, or repealing a rule" is defined as "rule making" by the APA. Id § 551(5).
10. See infra Part I.
11. See supra note 9; infra text accompanying notes 65-70.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 370-73.
The implementation of these recommendations will doubtless in some circumstances prove in-
convenient or costly to the agency. See infra text accompanying notes 380-81. In especially difficult
circumstances, the agency may rely upon the exemption from rulemaking requirements that applies
"when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons
therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary,
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The use of legislative rulemaking procedures is not the only cure to
be prescribed for the misuse of nonlegislative documents described
herein. An agency has the option of issuing its policies in the form of
policy statements that are genuinely nonbinding, thereby bringing them
within the "policy statement" exemption from the APA's rulemaking re-
quirements. 13 When it chooses this course of action the agency should
observe an alternate process, by which it can assure that its documents
are not binding and therefore will not be invalidated on the ground that
they were not promulgated by the use of legislative rulemaking proce-
dures. To achieve these outcomes, the agency should stand ready to en-
tertain challenges to the policy in particular proceedings to which the
document may apply, and should observe a disciplined system for main-
taining an "open mind" when passing upon such challenges.14
Finally, the Article recommends procedures through which an
agency, whenever it intends a rule to be legislative, should announce that
intention and inform the public about the statutory authorities and pro-
cedures by which it has acted.
Although the subject is complex and evidence is laborious to assem-
ble, it is manifest that nonobservance of APA rulemaking requirements is
widespread. Several agencies rely in major part upon nonlegislative issu-
ances to propagate new and changed elements in their regulatory or ben-
efit programs.15 This Article examines a number of agency attempts to
make nonlegislative policy documents bind the public.1 6 Frequently such
rules are not challenged in court, because the affected private parties can-
not afford the cost or the delay of litigation, or because for other practical
or contrary to the public interest." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B). Also available is the exception from publi-
cation requirements "as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published with
the rule." Id § 553(d)(3). These "good cause" exceptions supply an adequate safety valve, and
unless the agency can invoke them it should follow the recommendations herein. See Arthur E.
Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants,
Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. Rav. 540, 588-608 (1970).
13. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1988); infra note 66; see also infra Part V.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 359-63; see also McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas,
838 F.2d 1317, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[A]n agency's open-mindedness in individual proceedings
can substitute for a general rulemaking .... ); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n,
506 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("When the agency states that in subsequent proceedings it will
thoroughly consider not only the policy's applicability to the facts of a given case but also the under-
lying validity of the policy itself, then the agency intends to treat the order as a general statement of
policy.").
15. Examples are the Health Care Financing Administration with respect to Medicare and
Medicaid, the Department of Education with respect to guaranteed student loans, the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission with respect to regulation of pipelines, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission with respect to reactor safety.
16. See infra Parts III and V.
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reasons they must accept a needed agency approval or benefit on
whatever terms the agency sets. 17
The use of nonlegislative policy documents generally serves the im-
portant function of informing staff and the public about agency positions,
and in the great majority of instances is proper and indeed very valuable.
But the misuse of such documents-to bind, where legislative rules
should have been used-carries great costs. Affected members of the
public are likely to be confused or misled about the reach and legal qual-
ity of the standards the agency has imposed. One consequence of this
uncertainty can be that affected persons are unaware that the agency in-
tends to give its nonlegislative issuance binding effect. Probably more
often, though, the private parties realize all too clearly that the agency
will insist upon strict compliance, but conclude that there is little they
can do to resist. In either case, the uncertainty can breed costly waste of
effort among private parties trying to puzzle out how far they are bound
or otherwise affected by the informal agency document. 18
Doubtless more costly yet is the tendency to overregulate that is
nurtured when the practice of making binding law by guidances, manu-
als, and memoranda is tolerated. If such nonlegislative actions can visit
upon the public the same practical effects as legislative actions do, but are
far easier to accomplish, agency heads (or, more frequently, subordinate
officials) will be enticed into using them. Where an agency can nonlegis-
latively impose standards and obligations that as a practical matter are
mandatory, it eases its work greatly in several undesirable ways. It es-
capes the delay and the challenge of allowing public participation in the
development of its rule.19 It probably escapes the toil and the discipline
of building a strong rulemaking record. 20 It escapes the discipline of pre-
paring a statement of the basis and purpose justifying the rule.21 It may
also escape APA publication requirements22 and Office of Management
17. In at least one case, Congress has expressly precluded judicial review of failure to observe
§ 553's rulemaking requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(3)(B) (1988) (national coverage Medicare
determinations by Health and Human Services). But see Administrative Conference of the United
States, Recommendation No. 87-8, National Coverage Determinations Under the Medicare Pro-
gram, 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-8(4)(b) (1992) (recommending that Congress consider repealing
§ 1395ff(b)(3)(B)).
18. In some instances, agencies misstate the nature of their rules. See, eg., Chamber of Com-
merce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Cerro Metal Prod. v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964, 975-
78, 981 (3d Cir. 1980).
19. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988).
20. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43
(1983).
21. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42-43, 57.
22. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(1)(D), 553(b),(c). The requirement to publish in the Federal Register
"statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by
the agency," id. § 552(a)(1)(D), is honored far more frequently in the breach than in the observance.
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and Budget regulatory review. 23 And if the agency can show that its
informal document is not final or ripe, it will escape immediate judicial
review.24 Indeed, for practical reasons it may escape judicial review
altogether.25
One can readily understand how a governmental instrument so
quick, cheap, largely unchecked and low in risk, and yet so effectual, may
tempt some agencies to slight the APA's mandates.
A particularly perverse phenomenon arises from some courts' em-
phasis upon the discretion retained by the agency as an indicator of the
nonbinding character of its issuance.26 Under this approach, the more
discretion the agency reserves in a document, the better are its chances
that a court will hold that legislative rulemaking procedures were not
required, even though the public was plainly meant to be bound.27 The
theory is that the agency, by reserving discretion, has not bound itself.
But the incentives work the wrong way here. The prospect of avoiding
legislative procedures encourages the agency to be cagey rather than can-
did, and to state its rules loosely rather than precisely. A preferable test
would consider whether the constraints on private persons amount to a
binding of those persons. Otherwise, it is perfectly easy for a document to
reserve plenty of discretion for the agency to act variantly, even where it
makes clear that private parties will be held to strict conformity.28 Any
tactical advantage the agency may gain will come at the expense of clar-
ity and fairness to affected private persons.
23. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (Comp. 1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note
(1988). But see Memorandum from the Vice President to the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies on the Regulatory Review Process I (March 22, 1991): "The Administration has consist-
ently interpreted the Executive Order to include all policy guidance that affects the public. Such
policy guidance includes not only regulations that are published for notice and comment, but also
strategy statements, guidelines, policy manuals, grant and loan procedures, Advance Notices of Pro-
posed Rule Making, press releases and other documents announcing or implementing regulatory
policy that affects the public."
24. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 180-206
(1985).
25. See National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. EPA, 27 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1566
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 27, 1987). The court denied a petition for review under RCRA of an EPA document
because it lacked jurisdiction. The court stated that it has jurisdiction under § 7006 of RCRA only
where the document is a "regulation, or requirement." Id. at 1567 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1)
(1982)). The court noted further that whether a document is a regulation or requirement depends on
several factors including the agency's own characterization of the document. Id. at 1566. Where
there was no regulation or requirement satisfying this test, there could be no judicial review of an
agency action. Id. at 1567.
26. See infra Part V.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 305-08.
28. Consider, for example, the new 1991 EPA disclaimer form, infra text accompanying note
307.
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To countenance nonlegislative documents that bind is inevitably to
expand the agency's discretion in a most undesirable way. Although the
public is bound the agency is not bound, as it would be had it used legis-
lative rules.29 It is easier for the agency to deviate from or change posi-
tions taken in policy statements, memoranda and the like than it is to
deviate from or change those adopted through legislative processes.30
Additionally, it may be observed generally that nonlegislative documents
often are less clear and definite than legislative rules, and may enable the
agency to operate at a lower level of visibility, with greater discretion and
with fewer checks from the public and the courts.
Observance of legislative rulemaking requirements may appear bur-
densome to some agencies. One can realistically confront and assess the
practical difficulties, however, only after pursuing the greatest possible
clarity with regard to the concepts and requirements that these things
entail. That pursuit must be the first objective of this Article.
I. A SHORT TAXONOMICAL GUIDE TO AGENCY RULEMAKING
To subdue this problem, strong analytical tools are needed. The
courts lamentably have muddled critical concepts as to which clarity and
precision are essential for solution of the problem at hand. First, we
must be able to distinguish legislative from nonlegislative rules. Second,
we must be able to distinguish policy statements from interpretive rules.
Third, we must be able to identify the circumstances in which agencies
should use legislatively promulgated rules instead of nonlegislative rules
(which are either interpretive rules or policy statements).
29. See Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372 (1957) (sustaining the argument that "regulations
validly prescribed by a government administrator are binding upon him as well as the citizen");
Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 467-70 (1900); see also United States v. One 1985 Mercedes, 917
F.2d 415, 423 (9th Cir. 1990) ("To prevail on his claim that the agency impermissibly departed from
its own policy in seizing his property, Glenn must establish that the policy in question had the force
and effect of law"); Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(stating that an agency "need not adhere to mere 'general statement[s] of policy' "); Doe v. Hamp-
ton, 566 F.2d 265, 278-82 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
30. It is not clear whether the judicially established requirement of a reasoned explanation for a
change in policy, see Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57
(1983), applies to nonlegislative documents as well as to legislative rules or policies adopted in for-
mal adjudications. Compare One 1985 Mercedes, 917 F.2d at 423 ("[I]nterpretive rules, general
statements of policy or rules of agency organization, procedure or practice" do not have "the force
and effect of law.") with Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 800 F.2d 1181, 1184
(D.C. Cir. 1986) ("When an agency undertakes to change or depart from existing policies, it must set
forth and articulate a reasoned explanation for its departure from prior norms."). As a practical
matter, because nonlegislative documents are not easily challenged when they may be deemed unripe
or not final, judicial discipline over policy changes is minimized. See Middle South Energy, Inc. v.
FERC, 747 F.2d 763, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert dismissed sub nom. City of New Orleans v. Middle
South Energy, Inc., 473 U.S. 930 (1985).
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All of these distinctions arise under section 553 of the APA, whose
taxonomy I shall now briefly describe. This description will supply the
means to draw the first two of the distinctions just cited. The third is the
chief subject of this study, and will be treated at greater length.
A. Rules and Rulemaking
This Article is concerned only with agency actions that fall within
the APA's definition of "rule" by constituting "the whole or part of an
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing
the organization, procedure or practice requirements of an agency
.... 31 Issuances encompassed by this definition come in a myriad of
formats and bear a myriad of labels: legislative rules, interpretive rules,
opinion letters, policy statements, policies, program policy letters, Dear
Colleague letters, regulatory guidance letters, rule interpretations, guid-
ances, guidelines, staff instructions, manuals, questions-and-answers, bul-
letins, advisory circulars, models, enforcement policies, action levels,
press releases, testimony before Congress, and many others.32
The agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing any
such "rule" is defined as "rulemaking" by the APA.33 Final agency dis-
positions in matters that are not rulemakings are "adjudications," 34
which typically determine the entitlements, liabilities, or status of indi-
vidually named or identifiable parties. Agencies are entitled, without ob-
serving the statutory rulemaking procedure, to set forth in their
adjudicatory opinions the general propositions of law or policy that
formed the basis for the adjudicatory decisions.35 Though such state-
ments may create new agency law, they are not "rules," and are not ad-
dressed in this Article.36
31. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988).
32. See National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 701 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
33. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5).
34. Id. § 551(6), (7).
35. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194
(1947).
36. The author has previously addressed the problems of fairness and effectiveness that agencies
engender when they rely for making their law upon a process of case-by-case adjudication instead of
rulemaking. Robert A. Anthony, Towards Simplicity and Rationality in Comparative Broadcast Li-
censing Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1, 51-55 (1971); see also infra note 272. But nothing in the
present Article is intended to suggest that it is improper for an agency to lay down, as the basis of its
adjudicatory decisions, general principles to which it expects the public to conform.
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B. Legislative and Nonlegislative Rules
Rules are broadly classified as "legislative" and "nonlegislative. 37
This classification is vital for the present analysis. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has stated: "The
distinction between legislative rules and interpretative rules or policy
statements [i.e., the main categories of nonlegislative rules] has been de-
scribed at various times as 'tenuous,' 'fuzzy,' 'blurred,' and, perhaps
most picturesquely, 'enshrouded in considerable smog.' As Professor
Davis puts it, 'the problem is baffling.'"38
With respect, the distinction is very clear.39 Legislative rules can
readily be differentiated from those that are nonlegislative. The
37. The courts, unfortunately, sometimes confusingly use the term "substantive rule" to mean
"legislative rule." Compare United Technologies Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714,719 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
("distinguish] interpretive from legislative rules") and American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d
1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("whether a given agency action is interpretive or legislative") with id.
at 1045 ("the spectrum between a clearly interpretive rule and a clearly substantive one is a hazy
continuum") and Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("distinguishing between
substantive and interpretative rules"); see also Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 701 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (equating "'legislative' or 'substantive' rules"); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-03
(1979). Reasons for the preferred usage, observed in this Article, were well expressed in Metropoli-
tan School Dist. of Wayne Township v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 1992): "We find the use
of the term 'substantive' in this context misleading; an interpretation which explains the meaning of
the statute can be just as 'substantive' as a legislative rule. We prefer the interpretive/legislative
terminology because it avoids any potential confusion."
As used in this Article, the term "substantive rule" contrasts with "procedural rule," and has a
meaning parallel to the concept of "substantive law"--that is, a rule that creates or affects private
rights, duties or obligations. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1429 (6th ed. 1990). This is correct
usage under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1988). The term "substantive rule," therefore, em-
braces legislative rules, interpretive rules, and policy statements other than those concerned with
procedure, practice, or agency organization. See id. §§ 553(b)(A), 553(d); see also Joseph v. United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1153 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("Interpretative rules may be
substantive in the sense of addressing a substantive rather than a procedural issue of law .... ).
This Article also follows the widespread moder usage of substituting the word "interpretive"
for the statutory term "interpretative." See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A), (d)(2). For brevity, the term
"policy statements" is used in place of the statute's "general statements of policy." Id.
38. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations
omitted).
39. Professor Koch had it right when, speaking of the distinction between interpretive rules and
legislative rules, he wrote: "The distinction is not 'fuzzy' but clear: a legislative rule must be
promulgated pursuant to a legislative grant of authority. The distinction is troublesome not because
it is unclear, but because it is not always easy to determine .... " Charles H. Koch, Jr., Public
Procedures for the Promulgation of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy, 64 GEO.
L.J. 1047, 1049 n.1 1 (1976); see infra text accompanying notes 105-10.
Despite their language, the courts just quoted and the authorities they cited were not addressing
the distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules (interpretive rules and policy statements).
Rather, they were grappling with the question of whether a rule that plainly was nonlegislative
should be invalidated or remanded because the agency should have promulgated it through legisla-
tive rulemaking procedures-that is, whether it should have been a legislative rule. That inquiry is a
central focus of the present study.
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fundamental idea is that a "legislative rule is the product of an exercise of
delegated legislative power to make law through rules." 4
More particularly, a rule qualifies as legislative if all of the following
requirements are met: 1) The agency must possess delegated statutory
authority to act with respect to the subject matter of the rule.41 2) Pro-
mulgation of the rule must be an intentional exercise of that delegated
authority.42 3) The agency must also possess delegated statutory author-
ity to make rules with the force of law.43 4) Promulgation of the rule
must be an intentional exercise of the authority to make rules with the
force of law.44 5) Promulgation of the rule must be an effective exercise
of that authority.45 6) The promulgation must observe procedures man-
dated by the agency's organic statute and by the APA.46 Particularly,
unless it falls within an exemption in the organic legislation or in the
APA, the rule must be developed through public notice-and-comment
procedures47 and be published in the Federal Register.48 For purposes of
this Article, the most important of the requirements is the sixth.
40. 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:8 (2d ed. 1979); see also
Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1153 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1977):
The relevant distinction between legislative and interpretative or any other nonlegislative
rules is not the nature of the questions they address but the authority and intent with
which they are issued and the resulting effect on the power of a court to depart from the
decision embodied in the rule.
41. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-03 (1979). In the case of interpretation of a
statute that the agency has the primary responsibility to administer, such a delegation as to subject
matter may be implied from the silence or ambiguity of the statute on the points in question. Chev-
ron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984); see
Anthony, supra note 6, at 31-35. One may speculate that the Supreme Court, when presented with a
proper case, is likely to establish a similar presumption for rules that do not involve interpretations.
42. See DAVIS, supra note 40, §§ 7:10-7:11.
43. Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 302; Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
A general statutory grant of rulemaking power will ordinarily be sufficient to authorize the agency to
issue rules having legislative force. See, eg., National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512
F.2d 688 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
44. The agency may possess such authority, but intend to produce only a policy statement,
which of course is not legislative. See Batterton, 648 F.2d at 702; DAVIS, supra note 40, §§ 7:10-
7:11.
45. The issuance cannot be a legislative one if it is set forth in some format as to which the
agency lacks statutory authority to act with the force of law. See Anthony, supra note 6, at 36-40.
Also, if the agency retains a great deal of discretion to act at variance with the statement it has
issued, the issuance might not represent an effective exercise of the rulemaking authority. See
Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 667-68 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). However, if the agency intends that private parties are to be bound, the fact that discre-
tion is retained should not relieve the agency from observing the procedural and other requirements
for promulgation of a legislative rule. See infra Part V.
46. Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 302-03, 315.
47. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
48. Id. §§ 552(a)(1), 553(b), (d).
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An agency's issuance is a valid legislative rule if and only if it meets
all six of these requirements. All substantive rules that do not fit this tem-
plate are nonlegislative. They are either interpretive rules (if they interpret
specific statutory or regulatory language) or policy statements (if they do
not).
The APA requires the use of legislative rulemaking procedures for
every rule unless the rule falls within one of the statutory exceptions.49
The courts have repeatedly declared that the exceptions are to be nar-
rowly construed and reluctantly recognized, so as not to defeat the salu-
tary purposes behind the notice-and-comment provisions of section
553. 50 For present purposes we must lay to the side the exceptions per-
taining to the subject matter of rules51 and to the existence of good cause
to dispense with the statutory procedures. 52 These exceptions do not re-
late to the rules' legal quality. And the exception for rules of agency
organization, procedure or practice is also set to the side. It bears only
peripherally on the present study,53 which is concerned with agency con-
trol or guidance of private conduct-that is, with substantive rather than
procedural rules.54 The exceptions that are of concern here are those for
interpretive rules and policy statements. 55
C. Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements
Our focus, then, is upon substantive rules, which under the APA
may be 1) legislative rules, 2) interpretive rules, or 3) policy statements.56
This is the entire universe of substantive rules.
49. Id. § 553; see, ag., W.C. v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502, 1504 (9th Cir. 1987); Thomas v. New
York, 802 F.2d 1443, 1446-47 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987); Batterton v.
Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 700-01, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412
F.2d 740, 742-43, 745 (3d Cir. 1969).
50. See United States v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989); American Hosp. Ass'n
v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044-45 (D.C. Cir. 1987) and cases cited therein. On the benefits and
costs of notice-and-comment procedures, see Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Reg-
ulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 402-09.
51. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (involving military or foreign affairs functions); id. § 553(a)(2) (involv-
ing agency management, personnel, public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts).
52. Id. § 553(b)(B).
53. The question of when legislative rulemaking should be used for rules that arguably are
procedural was presented in Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d 369
(D.C. Cir. 1990),judgment vacated as moot, 111 S. Ct. 944 (1991), and is the subject of Administra-
tive Conference of the United States, Recommendation No. 92-1, The Procedural and Practice Rule
Exemption from the APA Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Requirements (to be codified at I
C.F.R. § 305.92-1).
54. See supra note 37.
55. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
56. See supra note 37. The label placed upon the rule by the agency, "while relevant, is not
dispositive." General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985).
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At this point, it is useful to envision a simple grid. Norms that in-
terpret can be issued either legislatively or nonlegislatively. Norms that
do not interpret can also be issued either legislatively or nonlegislatively.
All issued legislatively under the tests stated above57 are legislative rules,
whether they interpret or not. Those that are not legislative are either
interpretive rules or policy statements, depending upon whether they in-
terpret or not.
Because they are both nonlegislative, interpretive rules and policy
statements are often usefully discussed together,5 8 as in the subheading
just above. But they are critically different for present purposes. The
critical difference is that the courts do not treat interpretations as making
new law, on the theory that they merely restate or explain the preexisting
legislative acts and intentions of Congress.5 9 By contrast policy state-
ments, although within the agency's authority, do not rest upon existing
positive legislation that has tangible meaning.6° Neither Congress nor
the agency, acting legislatively, has already made the law that the policy
statements express. Thus these documents are looked upon as creating
new policy, albeit not legally binding policy as the documents were not
promulgated legislatively.61
57. See supra text accompanying notes 39-48.
58. E.g., Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (treating both interpretive
and policy expressions together under the term "non-binding action"); PETER L. STRAUSS, AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 157-58 (1989) (analyzing the
impact of "interpretive rules and other like formulations"); Michael Asimow, Public Participation in
the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REV. 520, 523 (1977) (con-
trasting "nonlegislative rules"--both interpretive rules and policy statements-with "legislative
rules"); Koch, supra note 39, at 1049-53.
59. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("agency is merely
explicating Congress' desires"); General Motors, 742 F.2d at 1565; Citizens to Save Spencer County
v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757, 763 n. 12
(D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974); American President Lines, Ltd. v. FMC, 316 F.2d
419, 421-22 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
60. See United Technologies Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The court
used the term "legislative rules" to refer to nonlegislatively promulgated rules of the sort herein
defined as "policy statements." See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
61. "A binding policy is an oxymoron." Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Secretary of the Navy,
843 F.2d 528, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see Anthony, supra note 6, at 2-6, 55-58.
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An interpretive rule is an agency statement that was not issued legis-
latively and that interprets language of a statute62 (or of an existing legis-
lative rule)63 that has some tangible meaning.64
A policy statement is an agency statement of substantive law or pol-
icy, of general or particular applicability and future effect,65 that was not
issued legislatively and is not an interpretive rule.66
62. "'An interpretative rule is one which does not have the full force and effect of a substantive
[legislative] rule but which is in the form of an explanation of particular terms in an Act.'" Gibson
Wine, 194 F.2d at 331 (quoting David Reich, Rulemaking Under the Administrative Procedure Act,
7 N.Y.U. SCH. L. INST. PROC. 492, 516 (1947)), quoted in American Hosp. Ass'n, 834 F.2d at 1045,
in Batterton, 648 F.2d at 705, and numerous other cases. "If the rule is based on specific statutory
provisions, and its validity stands or falls on the correctness of the agency's interpretation of those
provisions, it is an interpretative rule." United Technologies, 821 F.2d at 719-20.
A rule that purported to interpret a vacuous statutory term like "just and reasonable" or "pub-
lic interest, convenience and necessity" would not be interpretive; if it were issued by legislative
rulemaking it would be a legislative rule, but if not, such a rule would be a policy statement. See
infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. But see Friedrich v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,
894 F.2d 829, 837 (6th Cir.) (articulation of what is "reasonable and necessary" in particular circum-
stances held to be interpretive), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 59 (1990).
63. Eg., Indiana Dep't of Public Welfare v. Sullivan, 934 F.2d 853, 856 (7th Cir. 1991); Nason
v. Kennebec County CETA, 646 F.2d 10, 18 (1st Cir. 1981); National Ass'n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v.
Board of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., 489 F.2d 1268, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
64. A rule that interprets statutory or regulatory language having specific meaning can be
either legislative or interpretive. The fact that it interprets a statute does not reduce a legislative rule
to the status of an interpretive rule. A classic case of statutory interpretation by means of a legisla-
tive rule is Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). I
would hazard the guess that a majority of legislative rules involve interpretation of statutes.
Loose language in many of the cases, however, can be misunderstood to suggest that any rule
announcing an interpretation must always be a mere nonlegislative rule, even if the rule had been
promulgated legislatively. Eg., Gibson Wine, 194 F.2d at 329-31 ("[I]nterpretive rules are state-
ments as to what the administrative officer thinks the statute or regulation means."), quoted in Amer-
ican Hosp. Ass'n, 834 F.2d at 1045. The original culprit in this respect may have been the "working
definition" offered by the Justice Department: "Interpretative Rules-rules or statements issued by
an agency to advise the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it adminis-
ters." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL].
65. See the APA definition of "rule," supra text accompanying note 31.
66. It is said that policy statements are "designed to inform rather than to control." American
Trucking Ass'ns v. ICC, 659 F.2d 452, 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983). And
while policy statements often "advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency
proposes to exercise a discretionary power," ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 64, at 30
n.3, and perhaps always should do so, it is obvious that the category cannot be confined to state-
ments of these sorts. For example, a nonlegislative document declaring a policy that purports to
control or guide private parties' conduct is a policy statement. Whether it should have been issued
as a legislative rule instead of as a policy statement is a separate question. A document's classifica-
tion as a policy statement does not ipso facto qualify it for the policy statement exemption from
§ 553's legislative rulemaking requirements. To be exempt, the statement must be tentative and not
intended to be binding. See McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1320-21, 1323
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 945-47, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 37-39 (D.C. Cir. 1974); cases cited
infra notes 274-303; infra Part V.
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If the document goes beyond a fair interpretation of existing legisla-
tion,67 it is not an interpretive rule.68 Because it was not promulgated
legislatively, it cannot be a legislative rule; it therefore is a policy state-
ment. This is not merely the logical classification, but the proper one, as
the agency is making policy in an area not specifically governed by the
existing law.69
All substantive nonlegislative issuances that are not interpretive rules
are policy statements-whether they are captioned or issued as policy state-
ments or manuals or guidances or memoranda or circulars or press re-
leases or even as interpretations.
The cases are replete with statements to the effect that policy state-
ments are "designed to inform rather than to control."' 70 But many pol-
icy statements-and manuals, guidances memoranda and the like that
fall within the category of policy statements-manifestly are "designed
to control." These are the principal concern of this Article.
I have said that a substantive nonlegislative rule must be either an
interpretive rule or a policy statement. Rather surprisingly, this perhaps
self-evident proposition has eluded most courts and commentators, at
least in the terminology they have chosen.
On the distinctions between interpretive rules and policy statements, and between those forms
of nonlegislative rules and legislative rules, see generally I CHARLES H. KoCH, JR., ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW AND PRACrICE §§ 3.23-3.26 (1985); Asimow, supra note 50, at 383-401; Arthur E. Bn-
field, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the Making of Interpretative Rules and
General Statements of Policy Under the A.P.A., 23 ADMIN. L. REv. 101, 108-17 (1971).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 3-6. In a leading case, Chief Judge Patricia Wald sum-
marized the D.C. Circuit cases as having "generally sought to distinguish cases in which an agency is
merely explicating Congress' desires from those cases in which the agency is adding substantive
content of its own." American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
68. See United Technologies Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[R]ules in
which the agency sought to fill gaps and inconsistencies left by the statutory scheme.., picked up
where the statute left off; 'by no stretch of the imagination could [they] have been derived by mere
"interpretation" of the instructions of Congress.' ") (quoting Citizens to Save Spencer County v.
EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
("These rules... impose an obligation on the states not found in the statute itself. It cannot reason-
ably be argued that these rules are merely interpretative."); see also First Bancorporation v. Board of
Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., 728 F.2d 434, 438 (10th Cir. 1984) ("ITihe Board abused its discre-
tion by improperly attempting to propose legislative policy by an adjudicative order. Implicit in our
holding is a rejection of the Board's contention that this is an interpretative rule ....") (citations
omitted).
69. Consider, for example, what was said about the documents involved in Jerri's Ceramic
Arts, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 874 F.2d 205, 207-08 (4th Cir. 1989) ("more is in-
volved than mere 'interpretation' "); Cabais, 690 F.2d at 239 (rules and formulae "impose an obliga-
tion on the states not found in the statute itself"); Chamber of Commerce of the United States v.
OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 468-69 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (nonlegislatively issued "regulation does not merely
explain the statute"); Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 878-79 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (rules "founded on no explicit provisions passed by Congress").
70. American Trucking, 659 F.2d at 462.
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Although documents were plainly nonlegislative (because they were
not promulgated by notice-and-comment procedures), courts neverthe-
less in many cases have regularly asked whether such documents "are"
legislative rules7 ' rather than interpretive rules7 2 or policy statements.73
This method of framing the issue begs the real question and seems to me
to have bred unending confusion. For precision's sake, we must insist
that these documents cannot "be" legislative rules, as they were not is-
sued legislatively. What the courts in these cases plainly were looking for
was whether the agency was trying to issue a rule that was legislative in
nature. Did the agency, for example, attempt to "implement a general
statutory mandate"74 or "intend[] to create new law, rights or duties" 75
or "impose an obligation ... not found in the statute itself' '76 or "at-
temptfl ... to supplement the Act, not simply to construe it"7 7 or "con-
clusively determined the... trigger [for] the ... program allocations"? 78
In short, did the agency's nonlegislative action bind or attempt to bind
the affected public?
Thus, the proper question in these cases is not whether the policy
document is a legislative rule. Rather, the proper question is whether the
nonlegislative document should have been issued as a legislative rule in
the circumstances. The key to that question is, I believe, quite clear,
based on analysis of the APA and of the many decided cases: Did the
agency intend the document to bind? Has the agency given it binding ef-
fect? If the answer to either of these questions is "yes," the document
should have been issued as a legislative rule.
II. NONLEGISLATIVE RULES WITH BINDING EFFECT
Legislative rules79 have the force of law and are legally binding
upon the courts, the agency, and the public.80 Nonlegislative rules
71. Sometimes called a "substantive rule," see supra note 37.
72. Eg., Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing General Mo-
tors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074
(1985)); American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045-46 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United Technol-
ogies Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
73. Eg., McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1320-22 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) and cases cited therein;
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 37-38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
74. United Technologies, 821 F.2d at 720.
75. Fertilizer InsL, 935 F.2d at 1307-08 (quoting General Motors, 742 F.2d at 1565).
76. Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
77. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
78. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 41-48.
80. See Anthony, supra note 6, at 3 n.6, 39. More precisely, rules are binding and have the
force of law when a court may not review them freely, but must accept them unless they are contrary
to statute or unreasonable. Id.
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(interpretive rules and policy statements), by definition, are not legally
binding on the courts, the agency, or the public.
This Article deals with nonlegislative rules that have the purpose or
effect of binding the public as a practical matter. These are nonlegislative
documents that are intended to impose mandatory standards or obliga-
tions, or that as a practical matter are given that effect. 81
In general, a nonlegislative document is binding as a practical mat-
ter if the agency treats it the same way it treats a legislative rule-that is,
as dispositive of the issues that it addresses-or leads the affected public
to believe it will treat the document that way. Certain indicia that non-
legislative documents are binding in this practical sense are clearly
identifiable.
Obviously, agency enforcement action based upon nonobservance of
the nonlegislative document, or the threat of such action, bespeaks a
clear intent to bind and indeed puts it into execution.82 Here the eating is
the proof of the pudding.
Similarly, in the setting of agency actions that pass upon applica-
tions for approvals, permits, benefits, and the like, regular application of
the standards set forth in the document evidences both the intent to bind
and a practical binding effect. 83
A document will have practical binding effect before it is actually
applied if the affected private parties are reasonably led to believe that
failure to conform will bring adverse consequences, such as an enforce-
ment action84 or denial of an application.85 If the document is couched
81. This understanding, that the binding effects are practical ones and not legal ones, clarifies
one of the many terminological inexactitudes that plague this field, the so-called "legal effect" test.
Professor Asimow has summarized the usage of some courts and commentators: "The prevailing
standard for distinguishing legislative and interpretive rules can be described as the 'legal effect' test.
If a rule explaining the meaning of language actually makes 'new law,' as opposed to merely inter-
preting 'existing law,' it is legislative." Asimow, supra note 50, at 394. I suggest that greatly im-
proved clarity will be achieved if it is realized that under this "test" the court is actually looking for
practical binding effects, not legally binding ones. (And of course the rule is not legislative when it
was not promulgated legislatively.)
82. E.g., United States v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (conviction based on viola-
tion of nonlegislative Park Service document reversed). Other examples of these categories ofpracti-
cal bindingness are set forth in Part III.
83. Eg., McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("later
conduct applying it confirms [the] binding character" of the model, also evidenced by mandatory
language).
84. E.g., Jerri's Ceramic Arts, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 874 F.2d 205, 208 (4th
Cir. 1989) ("[Ihe proposed statement has the clear intent of ... providing the Commission with
power to enforce violations of a new rule.").
85. E.g., Linoz v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1986) (denial of Medicare coverage based on
manual).
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in mandatory language,8 6 or in terms indicating that it will be regularly
applied,87 a binding intent is strongly evidenced. 88 In some circum-
stances, if the language of the document is such that private parties can
rely on it as a norm or safe harbor by which to shape their actions, it can
be binding as a practical matter.89
It is possible that an agency will use mandatory or rigid language
even though it does not intend the document to be regularly applied
without further consideration. There is nevertheless a practical binding
effect if private parties suffer or reasonably believe they will suffer by
noncompliance. This phenomenon can occur especially where the docu-
ment is issued at headquarters but administered in the field.90
Mandatory language in the document may combine with the routinized
behavior of the field staff to produce a practical binding effect upon af-
fected private parties. Although the document may not have been in-
tended to be "finally determinative of the issues or rights to which it is
addressed," 91 its practical effect is to bind, and affected persons may not
be able to risk noncompliance to test it. Similarly, a document that ini-
tially was intended to be nonbinding, or one as to which the intent was
unclear, may harden into a fixed rule, with binding effect, by repeated
application. 92
A further emblem of practical binding effect is the absence of an
opportunity for affected private parties to be heard on proposed policy
86. E.g., Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
("mandatory, definitive language is a powerful, even potentially dispositive, factor" suggesting that
the nonlegislative rules were "presently binding norms").
87. E.g., American Bus Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("in reality a
flat rule of eligibility") (quoting United States ex reL Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976, 984 (E.D.
Pa. 1977)).
88. Closely parallel is the concept of expected conformity, which is important in determining
whether agency action is final, FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232 (1980), or ripe for judicial
review, Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). "Characteristics indicating finality include
providing a 'definitive' statement of the agency's position, having a 'direct and immediate' effect on
the day-to-day business of the complaining parties, having the 'status of law,' and carrying the expec-
tation of 'immediate compliance with [its] terms.'" Southern Cal. Aerial Advertisers' Ass'n v.
FAA, 881 F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 1989).
89. See, eg., Alaska v. Department of Transp., 868 F.2d 441 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Community
Nutrition, 818 F.2d at 943; see also Public Citizen, Inc. v. NRC, 940 F.2d 679 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
90. See infra Part VI.
91. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
92. "Where the language and context of a statement are inconclusive, we have turned to the
agency's actual applications." Public Citizen, 940 F.2d at 682 (Williams, J.) (citing McLouth Steel
Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); Community Nutrition, 818 F.2d at 943;
Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980); American Bus Ass'n v. United States, 627
F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1056-57 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) ("[Wlhere the agency's characterization of its action would fit them cleanly into a § 553
exemption, we think it the most prudent course to await the sharpened facts that come from the
actual workings of the regulation ...."); infra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
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alternatives, before the policy set forth in the document is concretely ap-
plied to them, and to have their proposals considered with an open mind
by the agency's polieymakers. If the document is to be applied rigidly to
private persons without first affording them a realistic chance to chal-
lenge its policy, its binding effect is evident. By the same token, if the
agency affords such an opportunity and genuinely is open to reconsidera-
tion of the policy, the document shows neither the intent to bind nor
such an effect.93
All of these practical binding effects will be more severe where the
affected private parties, for practical reasons, cannot invoke the aid of the
courts to challenge the documents. For example, regulations may re-
quire the exhaustion of lengthy intra-agency appeals before the chal-
lenged permit can be used, even on the agency's terms. 94
Applying the above guides to determine when a document has prac-
tical binding force may not always be easy. As Chief Judge Patricia
Wald has well observed with respect to one aspect of the problem,
"[d]etermining whether a given agency action is interpretive or legisla-
tive95 is an extraordinarily case-specific endeavor." 96 Similarly, Judge
Kenneth Starr, having stated that a "legislative rule is recognizable by
virtue of its binding effect,"'97 declared that "[t]his definitional principle,
however, is hardly self-executing," 98 and cited a number of "factors" to
be examined.99 That standards have a mathematical or mechanical
quality is not determinative of the agency's intent or use of them to
93. The courts often say that a document is not "legislative" (or not "substantive")-meaning
that it need not have been issued legislatively-if the agency has reserved discretion to act at vari-
ance with it. This notion, which I believe is flawed, is discussed below. See infra Part V.
94. See, e-g., 40 C.F.R. § 124.15, .19 (1991) (EPA).
95. Under the analysis and terminology set forth above, this effort is to distinguish an interpre-
tive rule (as to which legislative rulemaking is not required despite the agency's efforts to bind) from
a document that goes beyond interpretation and sets forth new law which the agency intends to be
binding. The latter document is not a legislative rule, since it was not promulgated legislatively. It is
a policy statement that should have been issued as a legislative rule. Thus, properly understood, the
distinction is between an interpretive rule and a rule that should have been legislative.
96. American Hosp., 834 F.2d at 1045.
97. Alaska v. Department of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
98. Id. at 446.
99. The factors in the Alaska case, and in Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943
(D.C. Cir. 1987), that reinforced the conclusion that the agency intended the action to have binding
effect were: mandatory language, prior grant of "exemptions," publication in the Code of Federal
Regulations, limitation upon the agency's discretion, and whether the agency could successfully
prosecute persons who had complied with the document. Alaska, 868 F.2d at 446-47.
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bind.10 The availability of procedures for waiver of the rule should not
change a rule from being one that binds to one that does not. 101
If a rule is conclusive on one factor but reserves discretion on the
second, it is not "any less of a rule... even though it does not purport to
answer the second question."10 2 Indeed, a single nonlegislative docu-
ment can imaginably be a layer-cake of elements: restatement of statu-
tory language, interpretation of statute, interpretation of legislative
regulations, policy statement declaring policy that is not intended to
bind,10 3 and policy statement declaring policy that is intended to bind.1 4
The last of these must always be carefully distinguished from the other
elements, to consider whether legislative rulemaking requirements
should have been observed.
A proper focus upon practical binding effects may enable us to un-
derstand why the courts have found the "distinction between legislative
rules and interpretative rules or policy statements" to be "enshrouded in
considerable smog" and "baffling." 105 I believe there are two principal
reasons for the courts' perplexity.
The first is that, properly understood, the distinction calls for a
largely factual judgment-to pass upon the agency's intent to bind (or its
practice of doing so)-without benefit of the sorts of evidence upon
which factual findings are ordinarily based.10 6 One needs only to sample
the opinions that parse the considerations bearing upon these distinc-
tions 10 7 to see that the evidence and inferences that can be drawn from
the administrative record are limited, making the court's task difficult,
though by no means impossible. It would seem quite wrong under the
100. Compare Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740, 744-45 (3d Cir. 1969)
(holding that document imposing obligation to pay compound interest on refunds was not an exempt
policy statement where agency would not reconsider the basic policy, even though it would entertain
waiver petitions) with Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (holding that document establishing a schedule of priorities for curtailing deliveries of gas was
an exempt policy statement where agency afforded opportunity to challenge the basic policy).
101. "In general, a discretionary waiver provision is not sufficient to qualify an otherwise nondis-
cretionary regulation as a 'general statement of policy'...." Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan v. Federal
Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 667 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1978). "In filing a waiver application, an
operator is entitled to be confronted only with rules adopted in the procedural manner prescribed by
Congress." Texaco, 412 F.2d at 746.
102. McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
103. See Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Ass'n v. Economic Regulatory Admin., 822
F.2d 1105, 1110-11 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
104. See Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
105. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omit-
ted). The full quotation appears in the text accompanying note 38 supra.
106. Chief Judge Wald has said that cases passing upon whether a rule is interpretive "turn on
their precise facts." American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
107. E.g., Alaska v. Department of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 445-47 (D.C. Cir. 1989); American
Hosp., 834 F.2d at 1045-47.
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Morgan IV doctrine10 8 to countenance discovery proceedings or eviden-
tiary hearings in which officials could be interrogated about their motives
or their deliberative practices. It is significant that the cases have not in
any way suggested that such procedures should be allowed. 10 9 The nec-
essary determinations can be facilitated by a clear recognition of the is-
sues that bear upon the inquiry into the practical binding purposes or
effects of an agency issuance.' 10
The second reason the courts have found the distinction troubling, I
would suggest, is one which has already been described: the reigning
confusion in the use of terms and their accompanying concepts. It must
be firmly grasped that rules that declare new policy can be either legisla-
tive rules or nonlegislative rules, depending upon whether they were
promulgated legislatively; that those not issued legislatively cannot ever
"be" legislative rules, even if they should have been; and that nonlegisla-
tive rules that do not interpret (or that "go beyond the statute" in an
attempt at interpretation) are policy statements within the APA's taxon-
omy and must be so treated when determining whether they should have
been issued legislatively.
III. EXAMPLES OF AGENCY USE OF NONLEGISLATIVE
RULES TO BIND THE PUBLIC
Our focus now narrows to the category of nonlegislative documents
that go beyond a fair interpretation of existing legislation and that the
agency makes binding upon the public. Again, these documents are
"policy statements" within the APA, rather than interpretive rules."'
An agency may use interpretive rules in a manner that makes them
108. The Morgan IV doctrine holds that it ordinarily is improper to subject a decisional official
to questioning on his or her decision processes, just as a judge may not be subjected to such scrutiny.
United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
109. See Public Citizen, Inc. v. NRC, 940 F.2d 679, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Rather than sug-
gesting discovery proceedings, the court said with regard to how it proceeds in these cases: "Where
the language and context of a statement are inconclusive, we have turned to the agency's actual
application."
110. The courts have suggested that the burden is on the agency to show that its act is within an
exemption to § 553. "The issue here is whether the agency has demonstrated that this case is gov-
erned by the exceptions to section 553." Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Say. & Loan
Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1978). "The exceptions to section 553 will be 'narrowly
construed and only reluctantly countenanced.'" Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 612 (9th Cir.
1984), quoted in American Hosp., 834 F.2d at 1045, and numerous other cases.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 65-70.
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binding as a practical matter, 112 but it may not so use policy docu-
ments. 113 The examples that follow illustrate agency use of nonlegisla-
tive policy documents to bind the public.
Although it is not necessary to do so, the examples are grouped for
convenience into the categories of enforcement cases, application-and-
approval cases, and benefit and reimbursement cases, with separate atten-
tion to cases involving administration by the states. The phenomenon of
the regular application of nonlegislative policy documents by field offices
of the federal agency and by the states will be discussed at a later
point,114 apart from presentation of these examples.
The majority of the examples are drawn from adjudicated cases.1 15
Because the courts have documented and organized the facts, these ex-
amples have been relatively easy to gather and can be summarized in a
relatively simple fashion. Other examples, collected from non-case
sources, have generally required more extensive presentation and
documentation.
A. Use of Nonlegislative Policy Documents in Direct Enforcement
Occasionally agencies rely upon guidances or other nonlegislative
policy documents as the law under which to bring or to threaten direct
enforcement actions in court or within the agency.
A-1. A demonstrator at Lafayette Park in front of the White
House was prosecuted for violating "conditions," issued but not made
part of its regulations by the United States Park Service, that restricted
the storage of property in the Park.116
A-2. The government sought an injunction and civil penalties in
district court for violation of the terms of a memorandum sent by the
Environmental Protection Agency's Director of Control Programs to the
EPA regional office air program chiefs, imposing stricter requirements
112. See supra text accompanying notes 3-6.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 7-11; infra Part IV.
114. See infra Part VI.
115. In the examples drawn from decided cases, unless otherwise stated, the agency's use of the
nonlegislative document was in each instance disapproved by the court because the agency had failed
to observe legislative rulemaking procedures. "Normally, a judicial determination of procedural
defect requires invalidation of the challenged rule." Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 711 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). This disposition will therefore not be recited in the individual examples. And rather
than appending a footnote to every declarative sentence, this section uses a single citation for each
case example in its entirety, unless reason exists to do otherwise.
116. United States v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding document "null and
void"; reversing conviction).
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(through a new method of computing) than those in the duly-promul-
gated state implementation plan in question. 117
A-3. One alleged violation remained after the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) had inspected the plant of a manufacturer of medical
apparatus, and the government pressed suit to enjoin it. The company
had fallen short of a sterility standard that had been set forth in draft
"inspectional guidelines" circulated by FDA's compliance office to its
inspectors. 118
A-4. The Administrator of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) spoke at a labor union convention and followed
up with a document captioned "interpretive rule and general statement
of policy," to the effect that employers would be charged with discrimi-
nation unless they paid wages to union representatives who accompanied
OSHA personnel conducting inspections of the employers' premises, de-
spite the absence of any such provision in the Occupational Safety and
Health Act.1 19
A-5. The Consumer Products Safety Commission, through a
"statement of interpretation," eliminated an exclusion to its Small Parts
Rule, violation of which could invoke a range of civil and criminal penal-
ties provided by statute. The court found that the statement did not in-
terpret, but amounted to an attempt to impose new duties having the
force of law. 120
A-6. Through an "order," which it argued was a policy statement
within the APA exemption, the Federal Power Commission for the first
time directed operators to pay interest on refunds it had ordered.121
A-7. Acting under statutory provisions outlawing discrimination
against the handicapped by institutions receiving federal assistance, 122
the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) without notice and
117. United States v. Zimmer Paper Prods., Inc., 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,556 (S.D.
Ind. 1989) (holding memorandum to be of no effect).
118. United States v. Bioclinical Sys., Inc., 666 F. Supp. 82, 84 (D. Md. 1987) (denying injunc-
tion; "At bottom, what the Government is asserting here is that.., the SAL [sterility assurance
level] should be what the Office of Compliance dictates it to be.").
119. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(vacating rule; "[M]ost important of all, high-handed agency rulemaking is more than just offensive
to our basic notions of democratic government; a failure to seek at least the acquiescence of the
governed eliminates a vital ingredient for effective administrative action."); see also id. at 472
(Bazelon, J., concurring) ("[A]dvance notice and opportunity for public participation are vital if a
semblance of democracy is to survive in this regulatory era.").
120. Jerri's Ceramic Arts, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 874 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1989)
(setting aside document).
121. Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969) (setting aside order).
122. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
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comment issued an immediately effective "interim final regulation" re-
quiring hospitals to post notices that discriminatory denial of food and
customary medical care to a handicapped infant is unlawful.1 23 Because
the regulation was "intended, among other things, to change the course
of medical decisionmaking," 124 it affected substantive rights and was not
an interpretation, and therefore was "declared invalid due to the Secre-
tary's failure to follow procedural requirements in its promulgation." 125
A-8. The FDA's regulations requiring tamper-resistant packaging
for certain over-the-counter drug products 126 were augmented by a 1988
Compliance Policy Guide (CPG),127 stating the agency's conclusion that
certain packaging technologies (tinted wrappers, and cellophane with
overlapping end flaps) were "no longer acceptable."1 2 A CPG such as
this one may be an example of an advisory opinion which the FDA states
"may be used in administrative or court proceedings to illustrate accepta-
ble and unacceptable procedures or standards, but not as a legal require-
ment." 129 However, if a drug company were wilfully to use tinted
wrappers or cellophane in violation of the CPG, it could hardly be
doubted that the FDA would initiate some sort of enforcement action.130
A-9. Under the amended Motor Vehicle Cost Savings and Infor-
mation Act, manufacturers were required to meet average fuel economy
standards.1 31 EPA's responsibilities under the Act included establishing,
"by rule," test and calculation procedures,132 and conducting the tests
and calculating manufacturers' corporate average fuel economy (CAFE)
ratings. 133 A manufacturer that failed to meet its CAFE standard by as
little as 1/10 of a mile per gallon could incur millions of dollars in civil
penalties. 134 EPA was criticized by the Comptroller General for its use
123. 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983) (the "Baby Doe regulation").
124. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 401 (D.D.C. 1983).
125. Id. at 400.
126. 21 C.F.R. § 211.132 (1991).
127. Food and Drug Administration, Compliance Policy Guide No. 7132a.17 (Mar. 1, 1988)
reprinted as enclosure to THE PROPRIETARY ASSOCIATION, ACTIVE MEMBER REPORT No. 32-88.
128. Id. at 2.
129. 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(j) (1991).
130. Though one would not expect any regulated company to flout the agency's policy in this
particular, this fact does not change the binding effect created by the evident agency intent to require
affected parties to obey the CPG's prohibitions. Potential penalties include injunction, 21 U.S.C.
§ 332 (1988), seizure, id. § 334, and criminal prosecution, id. § 333.
131. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2012 (1982).
132. Id. § 2003(d)(1).
133. Id. §§ 2002, 2003.
134. Op. Comptroller Gen. No. B-217744, at 2 (Letter from Milton J. Socolar, for the Comptrol-
ler General, to Representative John D. Dingell, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investiga-
tions, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (June 3, 1985)).
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of advisory circulars to make changes in the tests instead of performing
legislative rulemaking. 135
A-10. Nonlegislative provisions in United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) manuals are legion, and they are enforced. A large
number were cited to the author by USDA senior attorneys. 136 Here are
some examples from the manuals of the Animal and Plant Health In-
spection Service: a) A Veterinary Services memorandum went beyond
the requirements of statute and regulations 137 to add a requirement that
all containers used for exportation of animal embryos or semen (except
to Canada) must be marked with a legend stating that they must be cle-
aned and disinfected before return to the United States.138 A person con-
templating export could fairly expect that, if the legend were not
included, the inspector would forbid the export, or would cite a violation
if export were attempted.1 39 b) The gypsy moth regulations specify a
list of "regulated articles" subject to quarantine restrictions upon inter-
state movement. 40 Under the rubric "[i]f the article is one of the follow-
ing, then it's regulated," the manual adds a substantial and entirely new
category, "timber and timber products." 141 c) Certain garbage deriving
from food is regulated to avert disease; the regulations provide that "reg-
ulated garbage" shall be moved and unloaded under the direction of a
USDA inspector,142 but the manual requires that regulated garbage may
be transported only by an approved vessel.143 d) The same regulations
call for sterilization of regulated garbage by cooking and burial of the
residue in a landfill, except that burial is not required for materials ex-
tracted from the residue in certain cases. 144 The manual calls for burial
135. "[C]hanges should have been made formally [by legislative rulemaking], unless one of the
specific limited exceptions applied to a particular change." Id. at 1; see also id. at 8.
136. Group interview with John Golden, Associate General Counsel, USDA; Ronald Cipolla,
Assistant General Counsel, USDA; William Jenson, Senior Counsel, USDA; Thomas Walsh, Assis-
tant General Counsel, USDA; Robert Paul, Deputy Assistant General Counsel, USDA; and Harold
Reuben, Deputy Assistant General Counsel, USDA, in Washington, D.C. (July 9, 1991).
137. 9 C.F.R. pt. 98 (1991) (regulations covering "Importation of Certain Animal Embryos and
Animal Semen").
138. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA, Veterinary Services Memorandum
No. 592.111 (Feb. 6, 1991).
139. Interviews with William Jenson, Senior Counsel, USDA, in Washington, D.C. (July 7,1991
and Sept. 5, 1991).
140. 7 C.F.R. § 301.45-1(x) (1991).
141. ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, USDA, GyPsy MOTH PROGRAM
MANUAL 9.3 (Oct. 9, 1990).
142. 9 C.F.R. § 94.5(0(1) (1991).
143. ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, USDA, AIRPORT AND MARITIME
OPERATIONS MANUAL 3.40a (PDC 11/90-09).
144. 9 C.F.R. § 94.5(h)(2) (1991) (burial not necessary where residue is unsuitable for use as a
food or soil additive).
1336 [Vol. 41:1311
AGENCY POLICY STATEMENTS
of all sterilized garbage. 145 e) Regulations require that pet birds of U.S.
origin that have been outside the United States for more than sixty days
must be confined by the owner at the place where the birds are available
for inspection for a minimum of thirty days. 146 The manual requires
quarantine at the owner's residence.1 47
A-11. The Department of Transportation as successor to the Civil
Aeronautics Board issued, without recourse to notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures, an "Order Granting Exemption," followed by an
"Order Amending Exemption" and an "Order Clarifying Amendment to
Exemption." 148 Their upshot was that air travel advertisements may
state certain taxes and surcharges separately from the basic fares, with-
out being regarded as "unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of
competition" within the meaning of the Federal Aviation Act's analog' 49
to section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 5° After several
states, at the recommendation of the National Association of Attorneys
General, adopted statutes that conflicted with the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) position, the federal agency responded that "the
Federal government has preempted this aspect of state advertising regu-
lation."' 51 Twenty-seven states successfully sued to have the actions set
aside.15 2
As the examples below illustrate, the private party can be placed in a
particularly difficult position when the agency can take enforcement ac-
tion without prior recourse to the courts or even to agency hearing
procedures.
A-12. An inmate working in the Federal Prison Industries Pro-
gram refused to comply with a "program statement" that called for re-
mittance of half of his prison earnings to pay off certain obligations,
preferring to send the money to his wife. He was accordingly fired from
his prison job. Thus the document was made binding by the sanction of
dismissal. Although the program statement was couched in less-than-
145. AIRPORT AND MARITIME OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 143, at 3.40a.
146. 9 C.F.R. § 92.101(c)(2)(ii)(B)(1) (1991).
147. AIRPORT AND MARITIME OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 143, at 3.30.
148. Alaska v. Department of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
149. 49 U.S.C. § 1381(a) (1988).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988).
151. Alaska, 868 F.2d at 442-43.
152. Id. at 445 ("DOT's actions are strikingly similar to (and in all principled respects, the same
as) that deemed to constitute a legislative rule in Community Nutrition Institute [v. Young, 818 F.2d
943 (D.C. Cir. 1987)]; we therefore conclude that the 1988 Orders are invalid by virtue of the De-
partment's failure to employ notice-and-comment procedures.").
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mandatory terms and was argued by the government to be an interpre-
tive rule, it was applied in an absolute manner. 15 3
A-13. An assistant regional manager of the FAA sent a letter to
Los Angeles area pilots and operators of banner-towing airplanes, declar-
ing that they no longer could fly through a corridor in the Los Angeles
terminal control area. Since the directive would be implemented by the
FAA's air traffic controllers denying clearances to transit the corridor,
the pilots would be put out of business without any judicial action by the
FAA. The court held the letter to be a "rule" within the APA and re-
viewable as final agency action.154
A-14. In a similar pattern, the FAA sent a letter to aerial sports
parachuting operators, stating that parachuting would no longer be per-
mitted in a previously designated jump zone adjacent to and within the
San Diego terminal control area. The court again held the letter to be a
"rule" and reviewable final action.155
A-15. An FDA "import alert" required FDA agents at U.S. ports
of entry to detain reimported American-made pharmaceuticals unless the
importer could document their full chain of custody while abroad.
Under this document, FDA ordered an importer's goods to be reex-
ported or destroyed within ninety days, but agreed to a stay during
which the importer was able to obtain judicial relief.156
A-16. USDA meat inspectors base their evaluations on inspection
manuals and bulletins to the field, only relatively minor parts of which
are promulgated through legislative rulemaking procedures. The inspec-
tors have the power to close down a packing line temporarily for serious
violations, until the plant comes into compliance. The immediate eco-
nomics of the situation tend to compel the packers to comply with the
rules thus enforced rather than to endure a shutdown and await relief in
court. 157
Statements of enforcement policy are ordinarily issued nonlegisla-
tively. These statements typically set forth the criteria by which the
agency will select cases for prosecution or other enforcement action.
153. Prows v. Department of Justice, 704 F. Supp. 272, 274-76 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding program
statement null and void), afi'd, 938 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
154. Southern Cal. Aerial Advertisers' Ass'n v. FAA, 881 F.2d 672, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding letter invalid).
155. San Diego Air Sports Ctr., Inc. v. FAA, 887 F.2d 966, 967-68 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
letter invalid).
156. Bellarno Int'l Ltd. v. FDA, 678 F. Supp. 410, 411-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding import
alert unlawful).
157. Interview with John Golden, Associate General Counsel, USDA, in Washington, D.C.
(Apr. 9, 1991).
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Often they are lengthy and detailed, articulating quite specific stan-
dards. 158 To the extent they interpret statutory language that has some
tangible meaning, these documents pose little problem, as the agency
may lawfully attempt to make them bind.159 Similarly, where the state-
ment provides for the future exercise of discretion in its application, no-
tice and comment are not required. 16°
But what of statements setting enforcement policy under broad lan-
guage like "just and reasonable" or "unfair"? These in themselves con-
stitute vast subjects, lying beyond the scope of this study. But some
elements should be touched upon. First is the question whether a given
statement interprets sufficiently concrete statutory language to qualify as
interpretive.1 61 If it is concluded that the statement is not interpretive,
there remain questions of what it intends substantively and whether it is
meant to be binding. Those questions can be hard to answer.162 There
appear to be at least three possibilities: 1) Sometimes the agency is stat-
ing a safe-harbor policy, such that private persons may know that if they
observe the policy they will not be deemed in violation and will not be
prosecuted. But they will not necessarily be deemed in violation, or be
prosecuted, if they do not observe the policy. Such a document can cre-
ate binding norms.1 63 2) The agency may intend that the document, for
158. See, eg., the Guides and Practice Rules of the Federal Trade Commission, 16 C.F.R. pts.
17-24, 228-59 (1992).
159. But see the recommendations, infra text accompanying notes 364-73. Enforcement policies
that set priorities primarily in terms of resource allocation rather than in substantive terms ordina-
rily will not pose difficulties for present purposes.
160. See Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1012-15 (9th Cir. 1987); infra Part V.
161. To the extent the Guides and Practice Rules of the Federal Trade Commission, supra note
158, set forth detailed forms of misrepresentation or deception in industry-specific terms, they argua-
bly are interpretive of the statutory term "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). These statutory words are broad but nevertheless have
some tangible meaning when applied in a "negative" way-that is, to condemn acts which by com-
mon usage or general acceptation are "unfair or fraudulent or tricky." Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring). But where the rules use the
statutory words in a "positive" way-not merely to require refraining from unfair or deceptive acts
but to require affected parties to perform affirmative acts to be safe from prosecution-it would seem
hard to say they draw any tangible meaning from the statutory language. To that extent these rules
are policy statements, as they are not interpretive. See supra text accompanying notes 59-69. It is
worth noting that analogous documents issued by the Department of Transportation under its statu-
tory authority over "unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition in air transporta-
tion or the sale thereof," 49 U.S.C. app. § 1381 (1988), were held not to be interpretive. Alaska v.
Department of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 445-47 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
162. See Public Citizen, Inc. v. NRC, 940 F.2d 679, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that "policy
statement" identifying practices that expose the public to radiation in such minute amounts as to be
"below regulatory concern" was unripe for review).
163. E.g., Community Nutrition Inst. v, Young, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The FDA's
policy statement set forth "action levels," informing food producers of the allowable levels of una-
voidable contaminants. These were safe-harbor rules in the style of definition (1) in the text above.
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the purposes of administration and enforcement, will authoritatively de-
fine the offense. Then, any nonobservance is subject to enforcement ac-
tion, while observance comes within a safe harbor. This approach
creates norms that have a practical binding effect. 3) The agency may
try to have it both ways-that is, to hold affected parties to the standards
set in the enforcement policy, but deny the document a role as a safe
harbor, thereby reserving the freedom to proceed against persons who
conform to it but for other reasons are deemed in violation of the statute.
This again can create a practical binding effect.
Affected persons may flout these rules only at their peril. The agen-
cies rarely will declare which of the three approaches they are taking.
The usual disclaimers are consistent with all three,164 leaving affected
private parties uncertain as to which approach is intended and as to its
practical binding force. 165
B. Use of Nonlegislative Policy Documents to Pass upon Applications
Nonlegislative policy documents are often the vehicles by which the
agencies establish standards for approving or granting applications sub-
mitted by private parties. If the standards are intended to be routinely
applied, or if they are regularly applied, they of course have a practical
binding effect, even though they are not legally binding. This is true
whether the applicant is able to challenge the document in court or not.
Frequently the applicant is under some sort of practical compulsion
to seek the agency's approval. Guidances or manuals or other nonlegis-
lative documents that set standards for an approval that the applicant
must have as a business necessity, for example, or as the means of sus-
taining livelihood, acquire a particularly potent mandatory force. Where
denial would place the applicant in a position of noncompliance with the
risk of penalties, or would deprive him of essential sustenance, the stan-
dards as a practical matter amount to immediately enforceable regula-
tory norms-indeed, self-executing ones, because applicants in these
circumstances have little choice but to accept the agency's terms. And
because these applicants are typically unable to tolerate the delay or cost
that a contest would entail, the documents and the norms they establish
will often elude judicial scrutiny.
The combination of "mandatory, definitive language," id. at 947, with the agency's "own course of
conduct," id. at 949, gave the documents a "present, binding effect," id., and led the court to hold
the action levels "to be invalid in that they were issued without the requisite notice-and-comment
procedures." Id. at 950; see also Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 535-37 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
164. See, ag., 16 C.F.R. pt. 17 (1991).
165. An example of this problem is the Fish and Wildlife Service's announcement on the north-
ern spotted owl, discussed infra Part VI(B).
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B-1. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) adopted a "pol-
icy statement," concerning applications for operating authority to and
from Canada, which had the effect of releasing shippers from legally en-
forceable duties and constraints. 166 The court found it to be a" 'flat rule
of eligibility' "167 that "purports on its face to notify applicants for certif-
icates precisely what showings the Commission will or will not require of
them." 168
B-2. An ICC "Restriction Removal Statement" contained "guide-
lines" that were prefaced by a declaration that they were not intended to
prejudge any individual application. But the court found that "there are
sinews of command beneath the velvet words of the subsequent sections
of the guidelines," and that the guidelines as a whole were "decorated
with words that appear to be carefully chosen to avert classification as
rules." 169 The court remarked further that the "manner of dealing with
applicants who do not follow what is declared to be the 'normal' course
demonstrates graphically that the carrier who does not conform will in-
cur both delay and potentially vast litigation expense." 170 This practical
binding effect reinforced the conclusion that "these are not guidelines but
normative rules." 171
B-3. In another ICC case, the agency published an announcement
in the Federal Register that it was cancelling all existing "special permis-
sion authorities" and that these authorities would no longer be issued. 172
B-4. The Department of Labor's program handbook for employ-
ment of workers holding H-2A visas changed the definition of "prevail-
ing practices," thereby (as charged by the plaintiff farmworkers'
advocacy group) relaxing farmworker protection standards to which em-
ployers must adhere. The document as amended was published in the
166. American Bus Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding state-
ment unlawful).
167. Id. at 532 (quoting United States ex rel. Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976, 984 (E.D. Pa.
1977)).
168. Id.
169. American Trucking Ass'ns v. ICC, 659 F.2d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding guidelines
invalid), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983).
170. Id. at 463-64.
171. Id. at 464. The court quoted Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 701 (5th
Cir. 1979) ("An announcement stating a change in the method by which an agency will grant sub-
stantive rights is not a 'general statement of policy.' "). Of course, this document was a general
statement of policy as defined by the analysis in this Article, supra text accompanying notes 65-69,
but the court was saying that it should have been promulgated as a legislative rule.
172. American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 688 F.2d 1337, 1348 (1lth Cir. 1982) (holding
document invalid; "[T]he fact that the prospective announcement affects a discretionary function
does not deprive it of its rulemaking quality."), rev'd in part, 467 U.S. 354 (1984). "Special permis-
sion authorities" are findings by the ICC that cause exists to allow trucking rate changes to take
effect before the running of the 30-day period required by statute. Id. at 1347.
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Federal Register as an "informational notice" but no comment was
sought. Government counsel conceded that the handbook was
"mandatory" and "binding." 173
B-5. The Chief of the Guaranteed Student Loan Branch of the De-
partment of Education replied by an individual letter1 74 to an inquiry
from the New York State Higher Education Services Corporation, con-
cerning the eligibility for a new loan of a borrower whose prior loan had
been discharged as a result of his total and permanent disability. 175 The
letter specified that an otherwise eligible applicant is ineligible for a fur-
ther loan unless he reaffirms the previously discharged loan and meets
certain other conditions, and that a loan made without observing these
requirements would not be covered by federal reinsurance. 176 Although
the author of the letter spoke of it as an "interpretation," it would seem
difficult to point to specific language in the statute 177 that could yield so
detailed an interpretation. The threatened sanction compelled compli-
ance by the lending institution and the state-based guarantor organiza-
tion, although legislative rulemaking was not used. 178 The author of the
letter requested that it be circulated to guarantor organizations nation-
wide through their trade association, 179 thus making its requirements
known to those other than its addressee who might be affected.
173. Comite de Apoyo para los Trabajadores Agricolas v. Dole, 731 F. Supp. 541, 548 (D.D.C.
1990) (directing agency to engage in informal notice-and-comment rulemaking with respect to the
definition of "prevailing practice").
174. Letter from Saul Moskowitz, Chief, Guaranteed Student Loan Branch, Division of Policy
and Development, U.S. Department of Education, to Milton Wright, Vice President, Division of
Guaranteed Loan Programs, New York State Higher Education Services Corp. (Sept. 1, 1989) [here-
inafter Letter from Moskowitz].
175. The Higher Education Act of 1965 requires the Secretary of Education to discharge liability
on the loan of a student borrower who dies or becomes permanently and totally disabled. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1087(a) (1988).
176. Letter from Moskowitz, supra note 174, at 1.
177. 20 U.S.C. § 1087.
178. The letter stated: "We intend to include our policy in this area in an upcoming notice of
proposed rulemaking." Letter from Moskowitz, supra note 174, at 2. Such provisions were included
in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Guaranteed Student Loans, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,324, 48,342,
48,359 (1990) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 682) (proposed Nov 20, 1990). These proposed rules
have not yet been adopted.
179. Letter from Moskowitz, supra note 174, at 2 ("[P]lease understand that the Department's
interpretation of an applicable statute or regulation need not be codified in regulation or memorial-
ized in a Dear Colleague letter to be considered an official Department position. The expression of
that view by an authorized Department representative is sufficient. Nevertheless, we agree that this
Departmental interpretation is of sufficient general interest and importance that all guarantee agen-
cies should be made aware of it. To that end, we are providing a copy of this letter to the National
Council of Higher Education Loan Programs, which we have asked to distribute this guidance to its
members.")
It should be noted that by statute "any rules, regulations, guidelines, interpretations, orders, or
requirements of general applicability prescribed by the [Department of Education]," 20 U.S.C.
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B-6. In 1988 the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Mine Safety and
Health established a "Directives System" and manual °80 to provide gui-
dance on how the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) ap-
plies the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977181 and the
corresponding regulations. 182 The system is updated by nonlegislatively
issued1 83 program policy letters (PPLs), which in many cases establish
new requirements going beyond the regulations or impose new penalties
or penalty schedules.1 84 An example is PPL P89-11-8, which sets forth
specific criteria to be met for approval of electrical equipment that incor-
porates methane monitors.185 The pertinent regulation governing electri-
cal equipment 86 speaks of rugged construction, sound engineering, and
safety for the intended use, but does not specify engineering criteria for
particular types of electrical mining equipment. The quite specific re-
quirements of the electrical equipment PPL, which are stated in
mandatory terms, arguably amount to an interpretation of the regulation,
although the PPL recites that the pertinent part of the regulations "pres-
ently does not contain requirements relative to the use of methane
monitors on permissible equipment." 187 A manufacturer who does not
meet the standards will be denied the certificate of approval needed to
market the equipment, and operators using unapproved equipment face
citation and enforcement action.
§ 1232(a)(1) (1988), must comply with the rulemaking procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 553 and certain
additional special requirements. 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (b)-(g).
180. 2 MSHA ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL, ch. 100 (Release 11-4,
July 17, 1990).
181. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1988).
182. 30 C.F.R. pts. 5-104 (1991).
183. But see 30 U.S.C. § 811(a) (1988) ("The Secretary shall by rule in accordance with proce-
dures set forth in this section and in accordance with section 553 of title 5, (without regard to any
reference in such section to sections 556 and 557 of such title), develop, promulgate, and revise as
may be appropriate, improved mandatory health or safety standards for the protection of life and
prevention of injuries in coal or other mines.").
184. A 1990 PPL established higher penalties for mine operators or contractors with an "exces-
sive history of violations" (defined for the first time in the PPL). Increased Assessments for Mines
with Excessive History of Violations, PPL No. P90-III-4 (effective May 29, 1990). An MSHA ad-
ministrative law judge held that "notice and comment under the Administrative Procedure Act are
necessary before the program policy letter can be effective." Drummond Co., No. SE 90-126, A.C.
No. 01-00323-03638, slip op. at 16 (Mar. 6, 1991).
185. Approval of Methane Monitors Incorporated in the Design of Electric Equipment, PPL
No. P89-11-8 (effective Aug. 29, 1989).
186. 30 C.F.R. § 18.20 (1991).
187. PPL No. P89-11-8, supra note 185, at I (The regulations contain requirements for the use of
methane monitors generally, but these requirements "cannot be evaluated as a part of the approval"
of equipment.).
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B-7. The EPA used a nonlegislatively announced "model" to pre-
dict, based on "reasonable worst case assumptions," 18 8 the "leachate
levels" of wastes that applicants petitioned to have removed from the list
of hazardous wastes subject to regulation under the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act. 189 EPA argued that the model as a policy state-
ment was exempt from notice-and-comment requirements. In an incisive
and highly significant opinion, Judge Stephen Williams observed that the
document's mandatory language "suggests the rigor of a rule, not the
pliancy of a policy," 190 and that the agency's "later conduct applying it
confirms its binding character."1 91 "The agency treated the model as
conclusively disposing of certain issues .... On those issues, EPA was
simply unready to hear new argument. The model thus created a norm
with 'present-day binding effect' on the rights of delisting petitioners." 192
B-8. A landowner sought to fill portions of its property for build-
ing development.1 93 The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of any
"pollutant" (including dredged or fill material) into "navigable waters"
except in compliance with a permit issued by the Department of the
Army under the Act.1 94 The term "navigable waters" is defined to in-
clude "the waters of the United States." 195 The Army Corps of Engi-
neers' regulations claim that jurisdiction over "waters of the United
States" includes "[a]ll other waters ... which could affect interstate or
foreign commerce." 196
The Corps' Deputy Director for Public Works issued a memoran-
dum to all district Corps offices listing seven categories having a sufficient
connection with interstate commerce to warrant the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over isolated waters, including "[w]aters which are used or could be
used as habitat by... migratory birds which cross state lines."1 97 This
memorandum potentially swept into the regulatory regime millions of
acres of land for which a permit would be required to fill. The Corps
188. McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting 50
Fed. Reg. 7882, 7883 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 261) (proposed Feb. 26, 1985)).
189. Id. at 1319.
190. Id. at 1320-21.
191. Id. at 1321.
192. Id.
193. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd without op., 885
F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989).
194. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a), 1362(6), (12) (1988).
195. Id. § 1362(7).
196. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1991). Congress intended to confer a broad grant ofjurisdiction in
the Clean Water Act, extending to any aquatic features within the reach of the Commerce Clause.
See Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1978); California v. EPA, 511 F.2d
963, 964 n.I (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
197. Memorandum of Brigadier General Patrick J. Kelly, Deputy Director for Civil Works, U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (Nov. 8, 1985), quoted in Tabb Lakes, 715 F. Supp. at 728.
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asserted jurisdiction over the land involved in the present case on the
ground that the portions of it that were wetlands (though not water)
could be used as habitat by "not ducks or geese, but woodpeckers, song-
birds, etc."' 98 The court held that "the Corps intended the November 8,
1985 Kelly Memorandum [to be] binding and intended that it take effect
immediately,"' 199 and set it aside for failure to observe APA notice-and-
comment requirements. 2°°
B-9. Although the court held the document involved to be a
proper policy statement, the well-known Pacific Gas & Electric case201
nevertheless offers a useful illustration. In view of the diversity of cur-
tailment plans submitted by pipeline companies in response to a gas
shortage, the Federal Power Commission promulgated a "Statement of
Policy" which "set forth the Commission's view of a proper priority
schedule" and "further state[d] the Commission's intent to follow this
priority schedule unless a particular pipeline company demonstrates that
a different curtailment plan is more in the public interest. ' 20 2 The provi-
sions of the statement were clear and definite, and were couched largely
in mandatory terms, but also stated that "[w]hen applied in specific
198. Tabb Lakes, 715 F. Supp. at 728.
199. Id. at 729.
200. Id. The Kelly Memorandum was arguably an interpretation of the regulation 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(3) (1991). A later similar statement contained in Federal Register preambular comments
upon the regulation, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (1986), was apparently assumed to be interpretive
in Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 359-60 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1089
(1991). On this view, it would not be improper under the APA for the Corps to employ a memoran-
dum rather than a legislative rule to announce a position it intended to-make binding. See supra
notes 3-6 and accompanying text. The huge and debatable extension of jurisdiction it asserted, how-
ever, illustrates the good sense of using notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures for the promul-
gation of interpretations that substantially enlarge the agency's claim of jurisdiction, as
recommended in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 371-73.
The entire field of wetlands regulation has been the focus of enormous ongoing controversy.
See, e-g., Senator Johnston's proposed amendment to the Clean Water Act that would deny the use
of funds to identify or delineate wetlands under any "manual [that was] not adopted in accordance
with the requirements for notice and public comment of the rule-making process of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act." 137 CONG. REc. S9342 (daily ed. July 9, 1991); see also Michael Weisskopf,
Wetlands Protection and the Struggle over Environmental Policy, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1991, at A17;
How Wet is a Wetland?, WASH. PosT, Aug. 7, 1991, at A14; Bush's Swamp Thing, WALL ST. J., July
25, 1991, at A8. On August 14, 1991, the EPA, Corps of Engineers, Soil Conservation Service, and
Fish and Wildlife Service jointly published in the Federal Register a proposed revision of the contro-
versial wetlands manual. 56 Fed. Reg. 40,446 (1991). The prefatory material stated:
[Tihe proposed Manual on which we are soliciting public comment is a technical guidance
document and provides internal procedures for agency field staff for identifying and de-
lineating wetlands. Both versions of the document serve to advise the public prospectively
of the manner in which agency personnel will apply the definition of wetlands to particular
sites on a case-by-case basis.
Id.
201. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
202. Id. at 36.
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cases, opportunity will be afforded interested parties to challenge or sup-
port this policy through factual or legal presentation. ' 20 3 Largely on the
basis of interpreting this and related language favorably to the Commis-
sion, the court upheld the document. However, one may suspect that,
despite the language declaring its tentative effect, the document would
lead affected parties to believe it would be rigorously applied and there-
fore would bind as a practical matter. Perhaps the court had similar
doubts in mind when it cautioned: "We expect the Commission... to
refrain from treating Order No. 467 as anything more than a general
statement of policy. ' '2°4
Although regarded by some as a champion in the game of "rule by
memorandum," EPA has recently shown signs of recognizing its obliga-
tion to promulgate legislative rules when it intends to bind the public.
Twice in the last year or so it has backed away from actions that mani-
festly were based upon the premise that nonlegislative policy documents
may be enforced or applied in the same binding way as legislative rules
are.
B-10. In the preamble to a final rule approving revisions in Ken-
tucky's state implementation plan (SIP) under the Clean Air Act,20 5
EPA had stated that, in view of the complexity of the subject matter:
It would be administratively impracticable... to amend the regula-
tions and SIPs every time EPA . . . issues guidance regarding the
proper implementation of the NSR [new source review] program....
Rather, action by EPA to approve [revisions to a SIP] has the effect of
requiring the State to follow EPA's current and future interpretations
of the Act's provisions and regulations, as well as EPA's operating
policies and guidance .... 206
This is a rather explicit declaration by EPA of its intent to bind through
nonlegislative issuances. Obviously, if EPA interpretations and guid-
ances are binding on the states in their implementation of the clean air
laws, they are binding upon private parties who must gain the states'
approval of their permit applications. EPA stated further that it may
deem inadequate a state-issued permit not reflecting these positions, and
"may consider enforcement action . . . to address the permit
deficiency. '20 7
203. Id. at 50.
204. Id. at 43.
205. Notification of Clarification, 54 Fed. Reg. 36,307 (1989).
206. Id. at 36,307-08.
207. Id. at 36,308.
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After protest and commencement of litigation,20 8 EPA issued a
"Notice of Clarification" 20 9 in which it stated that interpretations and
guidances do not have "independent status... such that mere failure to
follow such pronouncements, standing alone, would constitute a viola-
tion of the Clean Air Act.... [I]n defending against such an enforce-
ment action [i.e., one based on such interpretations or guidances], a party
is free to assert that EPA has not reasonably interpreted the underlying
statutory and regulatory provisions. ' 210 The agency properly receded
from the assertion that its informal documents are in themselves binding,
and recognized that they are subject to challenge. 211
B-11. In a second example, EPA agreed to use legislative rulemak-
ing to promulgate a policy it had for several years enforced through in-
formal documents. The Clean Air Act212 establishes requirements to
"prevent significant deterioration" of air quality in "attainment" areas-
that is, those regions where national air quality standards are currently
satisfied with respect to given pollutants. 213 Those seeking to construct a
new major emitting facility or a major modification to an existing facility
must obtain a permit from the permitting authority (EPA, or the state
acting under a delegation or other arrangement with EPA).214 The per-
mit must include, among other things, emission limitations based on the
"best available control technology" (BACT).215 The BACT for any fa-
cility is "an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduc-
tion of each pollutant.., which the permitting authority, on a case-by-
case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic im-
pacts and other costs, determines is achievable for such facility .... ,,21 6
New source performance standards (NSPS) and national emission stan-
dards for hazardous air pollutants (NESHAP) promulgated by EPA gen-
erally serve as the baseline for BACT determinations. 217
208. Westvaco v. EPA, No. 89-3975 (6th Cir. filed Oct. 31, 1989).
209. Notice of Clarification, 55 Fed. Reg. 23,547 (1990).
210. Id. at 23,548.
211. To the extent interpretations are involved, those issued nonlegislatively cannot bind the
courts and should be reviewed independently (subject only to the court's respectful consideration of
the agency's views), rather than by a reasonableness test as suggested by EPA's language. See
Anthony, supra note 6, at 36-42, 55-60.
212. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (1988).
213. Id. § 7470.
214. Id. §§ 7475(a)(1), 7479(1); 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.21(i)(1), 52.21(b)(2) (1991).
215. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(4), 7479(3).
216. Id. § 7479(3). The definition in EPA's regulations is very similar. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.21(b)(12) (1991).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3).
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For a number of years, BACT was determined on a "bottom-up"
basis, roughly as follows: Starting with the baseline NSPS and any appli-
cable NESHAP, the permitting authority weighed the statutory consid-
erations to determine whether any higher level of control was "available"
and "achievable" in the particular circumstances of the case.218 Begin-
ning in 1986 and 1987, units within EPA adopted and imposed on the
states a "top-down" approach in place of the bottom-up method. Briefly,
in place of case-by-case weighing of factors, "top-down" requires use of
the most stringent control technology unless the applicant can show that
it is technologically or economically "infeasible." The first comprehen-
sive announcement of the new policy came in a 1987 memorandum from
the Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation to EPA's Regional
Administrators. 219 The Assistant Administrator stated that he had "de-
termined that [the top-down approach] should be adopted across the
board," and that a state-issued permit that "fails to reflect adequate con-
sideration of the factors that would have been relevant using a 'top-down'
type of analysis shall be considered deficient by EPA. '220 There followed
in July 1988 a communication (captioned "Memorandum," but intro-
duced by the words "this guidance") from the Associate Enforcement
Counsel for Air and the Director of the Stationary Source Compliance
Monitoring Division to various subordinate regional and headquarters
officials. 221 This document stated that "any one of the following factors
will normally be sufficient for EPA to find a [state-granted] permit 'def-
cient' and consider enforcement action: 1. BACT determination not us-
ing the 'top-down' approach. '222 Other documents were issued, stating
in various terms the mandatory nature of the top-down requirements,
which were applied consistently after 1988.223 But these requirements
218. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETIl-
RIORATION-WORKSHOP MANUAL, at II-B-I to B-5 (Oct. 1980).
219. Memorandum from J. Craig Potter, Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, to Re-
gional Administrators, Regions I-X (Dec. 1, 1987).
220. Id at 4.
221. Memorandum from Michael S. Alushin, Associate Enforcement Counsel for Air, Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring, and John S. Seitz, Director, Stationary Source Compli-
ance Division, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, to various addressees (July 15, 1988).
222. Id. at 2.
223. On March 15, 1990, the Source Review Section, Noncriteria Pollutants Program Branch,
Air Quality Management Division, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards of EPA issued a
document of some 76 pages plus appendices, captioned "'Top-Down' Best Available Control Tech-
nology Guidance Document." The cover and every page were prominently marked "draft." In
October 1990, EPA's Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards issued a draft New Source Re-
view Workshop Manual, containing a 75-page chapter, the bulk of which was devoted to a detailed
explanation of how the top-down process should be applied. Again, every page was marked "draft."
These informal guidance documents were never put into a final form, let alone made the subject of
rulemaking.
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were never made the subject of rulemaking procedures, or of any sort of
public notice, opportunity for public comment or any other form of pub-
lic participation in their development.
Litigation ensued, challenging EPA's promulgation of this
mandatory policy without the use of legislative rulemaking.224 In July
1991, EPA entered into a settlement agreement with the plaintiffs. 22 5
Although it conceded no admissions on any issue of law, fact, or liabil-
ity,226 EPA agreed to publish in the Federal Register "a proposed rule
proposing to revise or clarify the regulations defining BACT..., and
proposing to revise or clarify how BACT determinations should be
made," and "to take final action on the proposed rule as expeditiously as
practicable. '227 The settlement further recited: "Any EPA BACT pol-
icy statement or interpretation is intended only to guide the implementa-
tion of BACT under approved state new source review programs and is
not intended to create binding legal rights or obligations and does not
have the force and effect of law."22 8
These actions in the Kentucky SIP matter and the top-down case
bespeak some degree of recognition by EPA of an obligation to rely upon
legislative rules, rather than informal documents, to establish binding
standards and requirements. Interestingly, in the top-down situation
EPA might have been able to avoid obligatory rulemaking, even though
it intended its top-down precepts to bind private parties, by framing them
as interpretive rules. The key elements of the top-down policy arguably
can be linked to the language of the statutory definition of BACT.229 As
noted above, an agency is not obliged by the APA to use legislative
rulemaking for promulgating documents that interpret specifically
worded statutory language, even if it intends to apply the interpretations
rigorously to private parties affected by them. 230 On the other hand, I
believe the top-down documents are more properly viewed as policy
224. The principal case based on failure to use legislative rulemaking procedures is American
Paper Inst. v. Reilly, No. 89-2030 (D.D.C. filed July 18, 1989). Related cases are American Paper
Inst. v. Reilly, No. 89-1428 (D.D.C. filed July 10, 1989); Alabama Power Co. v. Reilly, No. 89-1429
(D.D.C. filed July 11, 1991); American Paper Inst. v. Reilly, No. 90-1364 (D.D.C. filed July 13,
1990).
225. Settlement Agreement entered with the plaintiffs in the cases cited supra note 224 (July 9
and 10, 1991).
226. Id. at 5.
227. Id. at 2.
228. Id. The quoted passage was immediately followed by a citation to the "clarification," supra
text accompanying notes 209-11, of the language in the preamble to the rule approving Kentucky's
revised SIP, supra text accompanying notes 205-07.
229. See supra text accompanying note 50.
230. See supra text and authorities accompanying notes 3-6. Portions of the top-down process
might be regarded as rules of procedure or practice, exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking
requirements under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1988).
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statements, which may not be used in place of legislative rules when the
agency intends them to bind. In its own brief in the litigation challenging
EPA's failure to promulgate the top-down policy by legislative rulemak-
ing, the government repeatedly characterized the top-down policies and
actions as statements of policy (or administrative adjudications), rather
than as interpretive rules.231 On this view, of course, legislative rulemak-
ing would be required to the extent the documents were intended to bind
private parties.232
If not a separate category, rules governing ratemaking should at
least be recognized as a distinct subset of the applications-and-approvals
category.
B-12. A Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issuance of-
fers an intricate example-in-point. The Commission in 1985 opened an
investigation of rates charged by local telephone companies (LECs) for
special access services including high-capacity communications (HiCap)
services. 233 The special access services rate category primarily embraces
large-scale private-line services offered by LECs to major interstate carri-
ers such as AT&T and MCI and to large business users. Separately es-
tablished rules required LECs to refund charges if their rate of return for
any segment of their operations (such as special access) exceeded the al-
lowable overall rate of return, even if the latter were within permissible
limits.2 34 Those rules were struck down by the D.C. Circuit in early
1988.235 In December 1988, the Commission announced in the special
access proceeding a set of specific new "guidelines" for evaluating the
lawfulness of HiCap rates.236 Although some comments were received,
somewhat in the fashion of FCC ratemakings, section 553 rulemaking
procedures were not employed. 237 These guidelines established issues
that differed significantly from the issues and factors announced at the
231. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, at 12, 33, 35, 36, American
Paper Inst. v. Reilly, No. 89-2030 (D.D.C. filed July 18, 1989).
232. On the fashion in which federal nonlegislative documents may bind or otherwise affect state
and local permitting agencies, and through them private parties, see infra Part VI.
233. Order Designating Investigation of Special Access Tariffs of Local Exchange Carriers, CC
No. 85-166 (released May 24, 1985) [hereinafter Designation Order].
234. Authorized Rates of Return for Interstate Services of AT&T and Exchange Telephone Car-
riers, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,350 (1985).
235. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 836 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
236. In re Investigation of Special Access Tariffs of Local Exchange Carriers, 4 F.C.C.R. 4797
(1988).
237. The Commission characterized the proceedings as "Rule Makings of particular applicabil-
ity." In re Investigation of Special Access Tariffs of Local Exchange Carriers, 5 F.C.C.R. 4861,
4861 7 (1990) (denying reconsideration).
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outset of the proceeding. 238 Among them was one (Guideline No. 1) that
largely resuscitated, for HiCap special access rates, the refund rules
struck down earlier that year.2 39
The accompanying order directed the affected companies to file sup-
plemental cases to justify their rates under the guidelines.24° In a Janu-
ary 1990 action,241 the Commission applied the guidelines, found (with
one exception) that the companies' HiCap rates in effect at the time satis-
fied the new guidelines, and therefore ordered no change in those existing
rates.242 The Commission also applied the guidelines to HiCap rates dur-
ing the 1985-1986 and 1987-1988 review periods. On the basis of Guide-
line No. 1, it ordered twelve companies to refund tens of millions of
dollars.243
The companies did not seek judicial review of the failure to use legis-
lative rulemaking to adopt the guidelines, as they were generally content
with the way the guidelines were applied to uphold existing rates, which
would continue into the future.244 They have, however, challenged the
refund orders on grounds of impermissible retroactivity.245
C. Use of Nonlegislative Policy Documents in Benefit Cases
Nonlegislative policy issuances have been used to deny benefits in
federal programs.
238. See MCI Telecommunciations Corp. v. New York Tel. Co., 5 F.C.C.R. 707, 708 1 10
(1990) ("The Commission... decided not to evaluate the specific... rates under investigation using
the approach [announced at the outset of the proceeding] but instead established a set of
guidelines.").
239. In re Investigation, 4 F.C.C.R. at 4803 1 58.
240. Id. at 4805 1 78.
241. In re Investigation of Special Access Tariffs of Local Exchange Carriers, 5 F.C.C.R. 412
(1990) (the "refund order").
242. Id. at 416 1 32.
243. Id. at 412-13 11 6-12, 416 11 34-37.
244. Interview with Alfred Winchell Whittaker, counsel for the Ameritech telephone companies,
in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 7, 1991).
245. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, No. 90-3146 (6th Cir. filed Feb. 21, 1990).
Even if one took the view that (despite the Commission's own characterization, see supra note
237) the proceeding was partly an adjudication because it included an investigation of past rates, the
method of promulgating the guidelines probably would remain improper. The 1988 document did
not merely address the past, but spoke without limitation to all LECs, for all the future: "[W]e will
require that all LECs provide a de novo justification of their strategically-priced special access rates
in each annual access tariff filing. The justification should consist of a demonstration that the rates
proposed will meet the standards [guidelines] set forth herein." In re Investigation, 4 F.C.C.R. at
4803 1 57. This is the language of rulemaking. That the guidelines were applied in a partly adjudi-
catory 1990 decision would not legitimate the failure to use rulemaking in 1988 (though their appli-
cation in 1990 might be sustainable procedurally on the theory that the guidelines were freshly
generated for purposes of the adjudication, see NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766
(1969)). Whether application of the guidelines could be sustained over the further objection that it
was impermissibly retroactive is, of course, an entirely separate matter.
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C-1. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) denied general assistance
benefits to full-blooded unassimilated Indians who lived near but not on
their reservation.246 The Bureau had issued its restrictive eligibility pol-
icy only through a BIA manual, not a legislative rule.247
C-2. The Department of Housing and Urban Development's HUD
Property Disposition Handbook One to Four Units governed the disposi-
tion of family residences foreclosed and transferred to HUD under its
mortgage insurance programs. Homeless persons and organizations aid-
ing the homeless attacked the document in several particulars, and chal-
lenged its validity on the ground that it had not been issued through
legislative rulemaking procedures. Language in the document directed
HUD's property disposition directors in the field to follow the policies
and procedures therein set forth.248
C-3. Plaintiff claimants.were denied Medicare Part B reimburse-
ment for certain services on the basis of provisions in the Carrier's Man-
ual, a nonlegislative document "made binding in Part B benefit
determinations" by regulations issued by the Secretary of HHS.249
C-4. The Social Security Administration's Appeals Council, rely-
ing on a Social Security Ruling that implemented a statutory amendment
directing the Secretary of HHS to formulate new policy in the disability
benefits program, reversed an administrative law judge's award of
benefits.250
246. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
247. Id. The Supreme Court found the Indians eligible under the statute, but assumed that in
view of reduced appropriations the agency could rationally limit eligibility to those actually living on
the reservation. However, the Court said that the "conscious choice of the Secretary not to treat this
extremely significant eligibility requirement, affecting rights of needy Indians, as a legislative-type
rule, render[ed] it ineffective." Id. at 236. "The Administrative Procedure Act was adopted to
provide, inter alia, that administrative policies affecting individual rights and obligations be promul-
gated pursuant to certain stated procedures so as to avoid the inherently arbitrary nature of unpub-
lished ad hoc determinations." Id. at 232.
248. Lee v. Kemp, 731 F. Supp. 1101 (D.D.C. 1989) (remanding for violation of notice-and.
comment rulemaking requirements). Although the subject matter was exempt from APA rulemak-
ing requirements as relating to "public property," 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1988), HUD had voluntarily
subjected itself to substantially the same requirements. 731 F. Supp. at 1112-13. Such a voluntary
waiver of the exemption is binding on the agency. Rodway v. USDA, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
249. Linoz v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding document invalid). Although
the subject matter was exempt from APA rulemaking requirements as relating to "benefits," 5
U.S.C. § 553(a)(2), HHS in 1971 had waived the exception. 800 F.2d at 877 n.7. In contrast, Fried-
rich v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 894 F.2d 829 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 59
(1990), held that a "national coverage determination," on the basis of which a Part B Medicare
reimbursement claim was denied, was an interpretive rule because it interpreted the statutory term
"reasonable and necessary." Id. at 837.
250. W.C. v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding ruling void; reinstating ALU award
of benefits).
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C-5. HHS's Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual and a
clarifying memorandum called for paying cost-control bonuses to hospi-
tals at the final settlement stage rather than at the interim payment or
tentative settlement stage.251
D. Nonlegislative Policy Documents Affecting Programs Administered
by the States
Standards in nonlegislative federal issuances often control the dis-
bursement of federally reimbursed moneys to or by the states, or the con-
duct of programs administered by the states. "The manner in which the
Secretary regulates the states controls the manner in which the states
regulate the facilities and that, in turn, controls the treatment of the
residents." 25 2
D-1. The Department of Labor issued an Unemployment Insur-
ance Program Letter, establishing detailed rules with mathematical for-
mulas for determining individual contributions to pension funds, for the
states to include when exercising authority under the Federal Unemploy-
ment Tax Act to provide in their respective laws for taking account of
pension contributions in computing benefits.25 3
D-2. Class action plaintiffs were threatened with reduction in food
stamps under USDA interim rules, issued without notice or opportunity
for comment, that implemented a statutory change in the definition of
"household." 25 4
D-3. The Department of Labor, by notification to regional offices,
established a new method of calculating the unemployment statistics by
which were triggered the emergency job program allocations to the states
under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act.25 5
D-4. An amended HHS regulation promulgated without notice
and comment was used to deny Ohio's proposed amendment to its
Medicaid State Plan, with respect to the ceiling on allocations for the
251. Mount Diablo Hosp. Dist. v. Bowen, 860 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding manual provi-
sion and memorandum invalid; policy that provides that bonuses are to be paid at tentative settle-
ment is a change that must be promulgated according to APA § 553).
252. Estate of Smith v. Bowen, 675 F. Supp. 586, 589 (D. Colo. 1987).
253. Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that document can be en-
joined; "These rules ... impose an obligation on the states not found in the statute itself. It cannot
reasonably be argued that these rules are merely interpretative.").
254. Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175 (Ist Cir. 1983) (holding interim rule invalid, though later
regulations legislatively promulgated were valid).
255. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding Maryland's claims justiciable
only in regard to changes in future methodology; further holding that those changes must be
promulgated by APA legislative rulemaking procedures).
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maintenance and support of noninstitutionalized spouses of institutional-
ized Medicaid recipients. 256
D-5. Certain forms, standards, methods, and procedures were re-
quired to be used by state survey agencies in Medicaid facility certifica-
tions. They were required despite the fact that, though they had been set
forth for comment as appendices to proposed regulations, they were
never included in final regulations. 25 7
D-6. To implement a 1981 amendment to the Trade Act of 1974,
the Department of Labor issued a series of interpretive letters directing
the states to calculate workers' eligibility for trade adjustment allowances
in a certain fashion, and threatened to impose penalties on a state that
refused to follow them.258
D-7. The Department of Education employs Dear Colleague let-
ters to direct compliance by state-based guarantor organizations259 and
lenders with the Department's policies for the Guaranteed Student Loan
Program. The Dear Colleague letters sometimes purport to interpret
statutory or regulatory language, but often add wholly new requirements.
The Department can withhold the reimbursement of funds to lending
institutions and to guarantor organizations that do not exert the efforts to
collect defaulted loans stipulated in the letters.260
One such document outlined the conditions under which the agency
will reinstate reinsurance coverage after a lending institution has violated
the federal due diligence or timely filing regulations.261 These conditions
include requirements that go beyond the statutory and regulatory lan-
guage.262 For example, the bulletin's entirely new section on "Cures for
256. Ohio Dep't of Human Servs. v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 862 F.2d 1228 (6th
Cir. 1988) (holding rule invalid because of failure to comply with APA rulemaking requirements).
257. Estate of Smith v. Bowen, 675 F. Supp. 586 (D. Colo. 1987) (holding HHS Secretary in
contempt of prior district court and court of appeals orders to promulgate regulations on the
subject).
258. Tyler v. Department of Labor, 752 F. Supp. 32 (D. Me. 1990) (holding eligibility policy
invalid).
259. State-based guarantor organizations may be agencies of the state, public nonprofit corpora-
tions, or private nonprofit corporations. These organizations are ordinarily referred to as "guaranty
agencies." The term "agency" is not so used here, to avoid confusion with the federal agency.
260. 34 C.F.R. § 682.406(a)(1), (a)(3); 34 C.F.R. § 682.411 (1991).
261. Letter from C. Ronald Kimberling, Assistant Secretary for Postsecondary Education, and
Dewey L. Newman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Student Financial Assistance, to state guarantor
organization directors (Mar. 11, 1988) [hereinafter Cure Bulletin].
262. The letter cites 34 C.F.R. § 682.406(a)(3), (a)(5), and 34 C.F.R. § 682.423(b)(1) (1988) as
the foundation for requiring the lender to comply with the minimum due diligence procedures and
with the timely filing deadlines in order for the guarantor organization to receive reinsurance on the
loan. But it is the March 11, 1988 Bulletin that delineates the actual situations that can jeopardize
the institutions' right to receive or retain interest benefits and special allowance payments on a loan.
See Cure Bulletin, supra note 261.
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Timely Filing Violations and Certain Due Diligence Violations" 263 adds
four additional steps and fifty-five days to the due diligence procedures
outlined in the regulations. The bulletin then specifies penalties for non-
compliance with the due diligence requirements, including the loss of
"reinsurance payments on a loan on which the lender has violated the
Federal due diligence or timely filing requirements, even if the lender has
followed a cure procedure established by the [guarantor] agency. ' 264
Although the regulations do not provide that the Department may with-
hold payment of accrued interest as a penalty for a lender's violation,265
the bulletin adds this penalty for due diligence violations occurring on or
after May 1, 1988.266 Additionally, the regulation relevant to skip trac-
ing267 has been expanded in the bulletin to require location of the bor-
rower and performance of an additional due diligence stream before a
claim is filed.268
IV. THE KEY TESTS: INTENT TO BIND OR BINDING EFFECT
Although they do not express it in just the same language, the illus-
trative judicial decisions cited in the last section support this simple
proposition: If a document expresses a change in substantive law or pol-
icy269 (that is not an interpretation) which the agency intends to make
binding, or administers with binding effect, the agency may not rely upon
the statutory exemption for policy statements, but must observe the APA's
legislative rulemaking procedures.270 The legislative rulemaking process
must be utilized if the document is to have the binding effect the agency
has in view.
263. Cure Bulletin, supra note 261, at 9-10.
264. Id. at 2.
265. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.413 (1991).
266. Cure Bulletin, supra note 261, at 8.
267. 34 C.F.R. § 682.411(g) (1991).
268. Cure Bulletin, supra note 261, at 9-10.
269. Numerous cases identify the class of changes that are subject to legislative rulemaking re-
quirements in terms such as "impose[s] rights and obligations," Community Nutrition Inst. v.
Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting American Bus Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d
525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); "modifies existing rights, law, or policy," W.C. v. Bowen, 807 F.2d
1502, 1504 (9th Cir. 1987); "effect a change in existing law or policy," Mount Diablo Hosp. Dist. v.
Bowen, 860 F.2d 951, 956 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Linoz v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 871, 877 (9th Cir.
1986));" 'substantially alter the rights or interests of regulated' parties," Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v.
Department of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting American Hosp. Ass'n v.
Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1987)),judgment vacated as moot, 111 S. Ct. 944 (1991); see
also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (A "substantive rule" or "legislative-type
rule" is one "affecting individual rights and obligations.").
270. This proposition does not apply to documents that interpret concrete statutory or regula-
tory language. See supra notes 3-6. The theory is that the agency is not making new law or chang-
ing the law but is merely clarifying or explaining preexisting law in the statutes or regulations. See
American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045-46 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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These cases reflect a realization that the agency should not be able to
fasten its will upon the affected public through any means it pleases. It
may not tell people what they can and cannot do except through proce-
dures that Congress by delegation has empowered them to use for mak-
ing law.271 It may not enforce or apply a nonlegislative policy document
in just the same way it may enforce or apply a legislative rule.272 Espe-
cially in view of the important values served by legislative rulemaking-
enrichment of the agency's information and enhancement of the rule's
acceptability, flowing from the public's opportunity to present facts and
views-can it credibly be argued that unilaterally issued guidances or
memoranda can possess the same force? Congress in the APA has pro-
vided that they cannot.273 In one way or another, almost all of the exem-
plar cases cited above mention an agency's intent to bind affected parties,
or a binding effect as administered, as a ground for disapproving the non-
legislative policy document.
Here are samples from the decisions citing agency intent to bind:
"We find this evidence persuasive that the Park Service intended the La-
fayette Park storage rule as an independent substantive rule. '274 "EPA
is attempting to impose the Rhoads memo upon Zimmer as a presently
binding rule. '275 "The fundamental question ... is whether or not the
Compliance Office of the Division of Compliance Programs of the FDA
may properly insist upon manufacturers of plated culture media meeting
an SAL [sterility assurance level, established by draft inspectional guide-
lines] of 0.1%. It may not do so.''276 "Because [OSHA] possesses legis-
latively delegated power to make legislative rules and because it is
apparent to us that [OSHA] must have intended this regulation to be an
exercise of that power, we hold that the walkaround pay regulation is a
legislative rule. '277 "Moreover, the effect of the new regulation exposes
the Administration's true intent.... Courts often infer the intent behind
an action from the action's foreseeable effects."'278 "Here, the language
of the statement and related comments establishes that more is'involved
271. See Anthony, supra note 6, at 34-40.
272. Even principles announced through adjudication, which may have the force of law at least
as to the parties, see Anthony, supra note 6, at 47-52, should not be treated "precisely as if they were
rules." Resolution of American Bar Ass'n House of Delegates (adopted Feb. 1985), reprinted in
Richard K. Berg, Re-Examining Policy Procedure" The Choice Between Rulemaking and Adjudica-
tion, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149, 177 (1986).
273. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
274. United States v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
275. United States v. Zimmer Paper Prods., Inc. 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,556,
20,558 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 5, 1989).
276. United States v. Bioclinical Sys., Inc., 666 F. Supp. 82, 83 (D. Md. 1987).
277. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
278. Id. at 469 & n.7.
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than mere 'interpretation,' because the proposed statement has the clear
intent of eliminating a former exemption and of providing the Commis-
sion with power to enforce violations of a new rule."279 "[O]rder No.
362 adopts a substantive rule imposing such rights and obligations."280
"The agency's own words strongly suggest that action levels are not mus-
ings about what the FDA might do in the future but rather that they set
a precise level of aflatoxin contamination that FDA has presently
deemed permissible. Action levels inform food producers what this level
is; indeed, that is their very purpose. ' 281 An agency contention that its
guidelines "are not intended to prejudge any individual application" was
rejected with the observation that "there are sinews of command beneath
the velvet words of the subsequent sections of the guidelines. ' 28 2 "In
short, the essential inquiry is what the agency intends to do, for if it
chooses to exercise its legislative rulemaking power, then that is what it
has done."'283 "[I]n this case it is clear that Brigadier General Kelly's
Memorandum affected a change in Corps policy intended to have the full
force and effect of a substantive rule, and that the Corps relied on the
memorandum in reaching its jurisdiction determination. ' 284 "When the
agency states that in subsequent proceedings it will thoroughly consider
not only the policy's applicability to the facts of a given case but also the
underlying validity of the policy itself, then the agency intends to treat
the order as a general statement of policy. ' 285 "The district court found
that [the Bellmon Amendment review program] was designed to alter
ALJ decisions." 286 "[S]ubstantial impact does not make a rule legisla-
tive, but whether a rule has a substantial impact may be relevant in con-
struing the intent of the agency in issuing the rule. In this case, there is a
great deal of evidence.., to suggest that the Secretary fully intended this
rule to have legislative effect."' 287 "This legislative and regulatory frame-
work heavily supports the conclusion that the Secretary intended the new
regulations to have the force of legislative rules. ' 28 "[T]he legislative
and regulatory framework suggests that the Secretary, at the time of their
279. Jerri's Ceramic Arts v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 874 F.2d 205, 208 (4th Cir. 1989).
280. Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969).
281. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
282. American Trucking Ass'ns v. ICC, 659 F.2d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 460 U.S.
1022 (1983).
283. American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 688 F.2d 1337, 1344 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 467
U.S. 354 (1984).
284. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726, 728 (E.D. Va. 1988), afl'd without op.,
885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989).
285. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
286. W.C. v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502, 1505 (9th Cir. 1987).
287. Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 182-83 (1st Cir. 1983).
288. Id. at 183.
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promulgation, intended the regulations to have legislative effect."'289
"The perceived need for 'exemptions' reinforced our understanding that
the FDA had intended the action levels to have a binding effect." 290
Numerous other opinions, beyond those in cases cited as illustra-
tions above, show the centrality of the agency's intent to bind. Here are a
few: "[S]tatements whose language, context and application suggest an
intent to bind agency discretion and private party conduct-the sort of
statements requiring compliance with § 553-will have that effect if
valid; interpretive rules or policy statements will not, regardless of their
validity. A binding policy is an oxymoron. '291 "When it added the Dis-
trict to its exemption regulation the Commission clearly intended to exer-
cise that authority and promulgate a rule with the full force of law."'292
"[T]o determine the effect of a Manual provision, a court must determine
the Commission's intent in authoring it.'"293 "[I]f by its action the
agency intends to create new law, rights or duties, the rule is properly
considered to be a legislative rule. ' 294
In the following cases, drawn from those cited as illustrations above,
the court's opinion identified the nonlegislative policy document's bind-
ing effect as an indicium that legislative rulemaking should have been
used: "Our limited holding is that the current action levels are treated as
substantive rules by FDA and, as such, can only be permitted if notice-
and-comment procedures are employed. 2 95 "Notwithstanding FDA's
unsupported protestations to the contrary, it is apparent that Import
Alert #66-14 binds not only the agency, but the importers as well." 296
"More critically than EPA's language adopting the model, its later con-
duct applying it confirms its binding character .... The agency treated
the model as disposing conclusively of certain issues. '297 "The rule im-
posed a ceiling ex proprio vigore. The rule was mandatory, not advisory,
and the mandate was a new one."' 298 "Although the Program Statement
provides that inmates 'will be expected' to allot 50% of their earnings to
289. Tyler v. Department of Labor, 752 F. Supp. 32, 38 (D. Me. 1990) (citing Levesque, 723
F.2d at 182 (1st Cir. 1983)).
290. Alaska v. Department of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing Community
Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
291. Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Secretary of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
292. Joseph v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
293. Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
294. General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1074 (1985).
295. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
296. Bellarno Int'l Ltd. v. FDA, 678 F. Supp. 410, 414 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
297. McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
298. Ohio Dep't of Human Servs. v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 862 F.2d 1228,
1234 (6th Cir. 1988).
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the payment process, this 'expectation' has been given the force of
law.... [P]rogram Statement 5380.1 has been itself interpreted by the
defendants as an absolute rule."' 299 "These rules limit state discretion in
this area and impose an obligation on the states not found in the statute
itself. '' 3°° "[A]t oral argument, agency counsel stated categorically that
the handbook definition is mandatory, binding Department policy, not
simply a factor to guide the discretion of regional administrators.
301
"The critical question is whether the agency action jeopardizes the rights
and interest of the parties, for if it does, it must be subject to public
comment prior to taking effect."' 302 "[A] legislative rule is recognizable
by virtue of its binding effect." '30
3
In their words, and yet even more in their holdings, the cases exhibit
a virtual unanimity in condemning the use of nonlegislative documents
(other than interpretations) that are intended to bind or that do bind in
practical terms.304
V. THE ROLE OF AGENCY DISCRETION
As a gauge of whether an agency should have issued a policy docu-
ment legislatively, the courts have made much of the discretion reserved
by the agency. Certainly there is a major role for this element of the
analysis. In many cases, however, it should not be determinative.
In his important McLouth Steel opinion, Judge Stephen Williams
succinctly stated the test that he distilled from numerous D.C. Circuit
opinions: "The question for purposes of § 553 is whether a statement is a
rule of present binding effect; the answer depends on whether the state-
ment constrains the agency's discretion. '30 5 The point of this approach
299. Prows v. Department of Justice, 704 F. Supp. 272, 276 (D.D.C. 1988), affid, 938 F.2d 274
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
300. Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
301. Comite de Apoyo para los Trabajadores Agricolas v. Dole, 731 F. Supp. 541, 545 (D.D.C.
1990).
302. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted).
303. Alaska v. Department of Transp., 868 F.2d 441,445 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Despite its language
rejecting the argument that an agency's action is legislative whenever it has the effect of creating new
duties, Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1991) is not contrary to the above
cases, since the rule in question there was interpretive.
304. A possible exception is Friedrich v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 894 F.2d 829 (6th
Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 59 (1990). The court recognized the binding character of the Medicare
national coverage determination ("The Secretary has chosen to seek uniformity by requiring Part B
carriers to abide by all regulations in the Manual." Id. at 837), but treated the Secretary's determina-
tion as an interpretation of the statutory language "reasonable and necessary," which therefore "cre-
ates no new law." Id. Certainly, the classification as interpretive is fairly arguable either way.
305. McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The discre-
tion considered here appears to be discretion to act at variance with positions set forth in the docu-
ment at issue. Perhaps distinct is the discretion as to substance connoted when the Eleventh Circuit
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is that, if the agency has acted tentatively, and reserves discretion to re-
consider and to revise or vary or rescind the policy before concretely
applying it, then neither the agency nor an affected private party is
bound, either as a legal matter or in a practical sense. On this basis, an
agency would not err in announcing its policy through a nonlegislative
document.
These conclusions must rest, however, on the assumption that,
before applying the policy concretely to a private party, the agency either
will promulgate it as a legislative rule or will hold its mind open to recon-
sider the policy and to accord the affected party an opportunity to chal-
lenge its wisdom.30 6
One difficulty is that this assumption is not made explicit in the
cases. At bottom, however, the problem is that the assumption will be
faulty in particular cases. As in many of the illustrative cases mentioned
above, the agency may well have settled firmly upon its policies, with
every intent of exacting conformity from those affected. The fact that the
policy is announced in a nonlegislative document-and speaks of re-
served discretion to act at variance with it--does not change that intent.
But under the D.C. Circuit's test, this tactic furnishes the agency with a
convenient chance to have things both ways: to impose a practical bind-
ing effect upon private parties, but also plausibly to argue to the courts
that the informal issuance and reserved discretion prove there was no
obligation to proceed legislatively. This strategy may through bureau-
cratic habit be pursued in the best of faith. But in reviewing the cases one
cannot avoid suspecting that the agencies consider it easy to fool the
courts on these points, or at least think it is worth arguing, in the face of
manifest reality, that their reservation of discretion means that they have
not bound the complaining members of the public.
In fact, despite any professed reservation of discretion, a nonlegisla-
tive document as a practical matter can quite readily impose binding
standards or obligations upon private parties. Their discretion is con-
strained even if the agency's is not. A test more consistent with the spirit
of the APA than one looking to the constraints on an agency's discretion
remarked that "the fact that the prospective announcement affects a discretionary function does not
deprive it of its rulemaking quality." American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 688 F.2d 1337,
1348 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 354 (1984).
306. "[Ain agency's open-mindedness in individual proceedings can substitute for a general
rulemaking .... McLouth, 838 F.2d at 1325. The agency may say what it is thinking of doing.
That is a policy statement. But when it knows what it is going to do, it must use legislative
rulemaking.
Citing McLouth, the same Circuit in a related context spoke of a "presumption of closed-mind.
edness." Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
judgment vacated as moot, II1 S. Ct. 944 (1991).
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would be one that considered whether the intended or actual constraints
on the private persons' discretion (that is, upon their freedom of action)
amount to binding them in a practical sense. If so, the recitation that
discretion is reserved should be of no moment, and the agency's circum-
vention of legislative rulemaking procedures should be redressed.
These points may be illustrated by the following form of disclaimer,
which the EPA prepared in the summer of 1991 for inclusion in guid-
ances and other nonlegislative issuances:
NOTICE: The policies set out in this [document] are not final agency
action, but are intended solely as guidance. They are not intended, nor
can they be relied upon, to create any rights enforceable by any party
in litigation with the United States. EPA officials may decide to follow
the guidance provided in this [document] or to act at variance with the
guidance, based on an analysis of site-specific circumstances. The
Agency also reserves the right to change this guidance at any time
without public notice.307
It scarcely needs to be observed that this provision is wholly one-sided.
The substantive elements in EPA guidance documents are often couched
in specific and facially mandatory terms, by which affected private par-
ties may reasonably believe themselves to be bound in one of the practical
senses described above.308 The quoted EPA statement preserves great
discretion for the agency. But it yields no flexibility to affected persons,
nor does it afford any assurance that they will have a realistic chance to
challenge the substantive policy positions set forth in the document.
The literal application of the D.C. Circuit's discretion test would
sanction the use of nonlegislative procedures for a document endorsed
with this disclaimer. And yet if the document is binding as a practical
matter-because it is framed in mandatory terms or is regularly applied
or is so structured that in context affected persons cannot disregard it-it
would be quite wrong to hold that such a disclaimer excuses the failure
to observe notice-and-comment requirements.
To do so in such a case would leave the private party in the worst of
possible worlds: The private party is bound but the agency retains full
freedom to act at variance with its stated position. The reservation of
discretion affords the agency scope for unpredictable behavior, without
diminishing the prospective compliance burden on the private party. Al-
ternatively, there is little to deter the agency, despite its reservation of
discretion to decide variantly, from relentlessly applying the stated posi-
tions as though they had the full force of law.
307. Interview with E. Donald Elliott, General Counsel, and Charles L. Elkins, Associate Gen-
eral Counsel, EPA, in Washington, D.C. (July 10, 1991).
308. See supra Part II.
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Under the corollary to the D.C. Circuit's position-that the more
discretion the agency reserves the less likely it is that the rule will be
treated as legislative-the agency is rewarded for stating its rules with
less precision and authority than might otherwise be required of it. Yet
as a practical matter it still may be able to apply or threaten to apply the
rule in a binding way. It is simply bad government to tolerate the notion
that the more discretion an agency reserves for itself the more readily it
can escape the obligation to promulgate its rules in the manner instructed
by Congress.
Only if the agency makes it clear that it retains an open mind on the
final terms of the policy should the fact that it retains discretion validate
its use of nonlegislative guidance documents. If the agency mind is open,
the affected party's opportunity at a later proceeding to contend for an
alternative or modified policy, or for abandonment of the tentatively
adopted one, is the functional equivalent of the opportunity to comment
in a legislative rulemaking proceeding.
Thus, an agency may issue a statement of policy setting forth the
standards it expects to apply in granting certain approvals. If the agency
genuinely maintains an open mind, so that an applicant has a realistic
chance to persuade it to adopt a different position when the applicant's
particular case is passed upon, the original policy statement had neither
the intent nor the effect of imposing mandatory constraints on the appli-
cant. The agency therefore was not obliged to use legislative rulemaking
procedures to issue it.309
Similarly, if an agency administering a vague statute sets forth a
guidance as to the kinds of behavior it will take enforcement action
against, but persons guilty of that behavior have a real opportunity when
proceeded against to persuade the agency that that behavior should not
be deemed culpable, then the guidance may be issued without observing
legislative rulemaking procedure, as it has neither the intent nor the ef-
fect of foreclosing the private party.
309. "When the agency states that in subsequent proceedings it will thoroughly consider not
only the policy's applicability to the facts of a given case but also the underlying validity of the policy
itself, then the agency intends to treat the order [which in FPC parlance can be a rule] as a general
statement of policy [within the exemption of APA § 553(b)(A)]." Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
To be treated as having an open mind, it should not be enough that the agency permits affected
persons to seek waivers or exceptions from the stated position. In Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969), the Commission "elected to proceed in this case by making a
general rule," id at 745 (footnote omitted). The court held that Texaco was "harmed by being faced
with such a general rule which it must overcome in any ad hoc waiver proceeding .... In filing a
waiver application, an operator is entitled to be confronted only with rules adopted in the procedural
manner prescribed by Congress." Id. at 746 (footnote omitted).
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But if the outcome of the later proceeding is a foregone conclusion
because the earlier policy statement or guidance was to be mechanically
applied, there clearly has been an intent or an effect making it binding on
the private parties as a practical matter, and legislative rulemaking
should have been used.310
The announced position might be mechanically applied because the
agency decisionmakers intended all along to apply it that way. But it
also might be mechanically applied because staff or administrative law
judges or cooperating state officials felt obliged to follow strictly the doc-
ument that came from headquarters, even if the agency heads had not
intended that those officials be obliged to follow it. Thus the agency
would be well advised to establish a system to prevent the inadvertent
closing of minds it intends be kept open. Elements of such a system for
assuring that policies are tentative are proposed in Part VII of this
Article.
If the agency genuinely has put its document forth on a tentative
basis and with an open mind, it should willingly implement the discipli-
nary measures needed to assure that its intent is effectuated. But when
an agency in practice does not provide realistic opportunities to challenge
its purportedly tentative policies, or conceals the availability of such op-
portunities, or issues documents in a way that leaves ambivalence or con-
fusion about their legal effect, its claim to exemption from the APA's
rulemaking requirements is to that extent vitiated. An agency should not
be suffered to come into court and plead, as agencies so often have done,
that the uncertainties with which it has surrounded the document estab-
lish its tentative effect and thereby excuse the failure to obey the
rulemaking commands of the APA.
VI. ADMINISTRATION OF POLICIES BY AGENCY STAFF
AND BY THE STATES
Two further circumstances must be taken into account where agen-
cies have issued nonlegislative policy documents.
A. Administration of Nonlegislative Policy Documents by Agency Staff
General knowledge of normal bureaucratic behavior permits us to
postulate a basic general proposition about how nonlegislative guidance
documents are administered by the agencies' own staffs, especially in the
310. "Had petitioner seriously attacked the reasoning of the Policy Statement, and had ERA
responded merely by saying, in effect, 'That is no longer open to discussion. We resolved it in the
Policy Statement,' then the agency's conduct would belie its characterization of the Policy State-
ment." Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Ass'n v. Economic Regulatory Admin., 822 F.2d
1105, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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field: Staff members acting upon matters to which the guidance docu-
ments pertain will routinely and indeed automatically apply those docu-
ments, rather than considering their policy afresh before deciding
whether to apply them. Staffers generally will not feel free to question
the stated policies, and will not in practice do so.
Staff members, including the most conscientious, have every incen-
tive to act in this fashion. To accept the agency guidance as conclusive is
the quick and simple thing to do, and leaves staff members relatively
invulnerable to criticism. By contrast, to treat the document as tentative,
and therefore as subject to reconsideration upon the request of affected
parties, would demand more time and effort, and would expose staff
members to disapproval for departing from established positions. And
treating the matter as a settled part of the operational routine is more
comfortable for staff members than having to consider the policy anew
each time it is to be applied.
Circumstances of course vary in our complicated government. Some
nonlegislative policy documents may be framed in general language that
is not capable of regularized application, and some may make it clear
that the guidance is tentative only. But otherwise, I suspect that the
above observations hold true in the great majority of cases. And I sus-
pect that they hold true whether or not the agency 311 intended its docu-
ment to bind the staff.312 Indeed, although the agency may protest
otherwise, it can often be quite clear that its nonlegislative document was
intended to control the staff's basis for decision. 313 But even if the docu-
ment was intended merely to guide, the tendencies mentioned are likely
311. Although judicial opinions customarily observe the polite fiction of dealing with a rule as
though it had been issued by "the Secretary" or "the Administrator" or "the Commission," in real-
ity (as shown by numerous examples in Part III above) nonlegislative documents often-and I would
think usually-emanate from officials below the level of the agency heads. To announce policies
nonlegislatively, those officials do not ordinarily need a delegation of authority from the agency
heads, as they would if the policies were to be issued legislatively. But there is no reason to think
that nonlegislative statements issued by lesser officials are applied by subordinates any less regularly
than are nonlegislative issuances from the top.
312. The Administrative Conference's rulemaking manual distinguishes among documents that
(by intent or effect) bind 1) lower-level staff, 2) members of the public, and 3) the agency itself, and
accurately adds: "Any form of binding effect will take an agency pronouncement out of the policy
statement exemption because policy statements are to have prospective and not immediate effect."
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, A GUIDE
TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 65 (2d ed. 1991).
313. See, eg., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 233-35 (1974) (BIA); Lee v. Kemp, 731 F. Supp.
1101, 1113-14 (D.D.C. 1989) (HUD); Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726, 728-29
(E.D. Va. 1988) (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), afl'd without op., 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Bioclinical Sys., Inc., 666 F. Supp. 82, 83-84 (D. Md. 1987) (FDA); Fugere v.
Derwinski, 119 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 289, 294 (U.S. Ct. Veterans App. Dec. 27, 1990) (rejecting
agency argument that the provision's placement in a "procedural manual for the use of field person-
nel" prevented it from being a "substantive rule"); Example A-10, supra text accompanying notes
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to harden it into a rigidly applied rule, with the effect of binding private
parties.314
B. Administration of Nonlegislative Policy Documents by the States
The ways federal and state administrative actions interplay are
many, and the span of fields that their interplay touches is broad. It
reaches housing, social security, education, environmental protection,
conservation, medicare, transfer programs like food stamps and unem-
ployment compensation, and a myriad of others. The role played by fed-
eral guidance documents in so cluttered an arena cannot be
comprehensively dealt with here.315
136-47 (USDA inspection manuals); Example B-6, supra text accompanying notes 180-87 (MSHA
inspection manuals).
314. The spokesman to whom I was directed by EPA stated that there are a number of circum-
stances in which EPA's staff permit writers may depart from guidance documents. The permit
writers may not disregard the guidance, but may deem an exception appropriate where the guidance
makes no sense in a given application, where its applicability is doubtful, or where the guidance is
cast in flexible terms such that the permit writer must decide what a concept (like "best available
control technology") means in a given application. But the permit writer cannot change basic pol-
icy, for example, by allowing use of a lesser technology in place of the "best" on a nontechnical
ground such as saving jobs. Nor can the permit writer ignore a methodology mandated by a gui-
dance, such as use of the "top-down" method for determining best available control technology. See
supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text. Where the guidance is cast in directive language, the
staff will follow it faithfully. There is, however, some flexibility in most EPA guidances. The
spokesman noted that many EPA draft permits are subject to public comment, which supplies an
opportunity for challenge to relevant guidances and affords a procedure functionally similar to the
notice-and-comment procedure of APA § 553. Telephone interview with Walter Mugdan, Deputy
Regional Counsel, Region II, EPA (Aug. 14, 1991). Nothing in the EPA manuals for permit writers
requires them to treat guidance documents as tentative or to maintain a willingness to reconsider the
policies if challenged. Telephone interview with Charles L. Elkins, Associate General Counsel, EPA
(Nov. 25, 1991).
The EPA's Judicial Officer, who hears appeals in the Administrator's stead, has occasionally
rejected or departed from the agency's guidances. Id. An example is In re Hoechst Celanese Corp.,
RCRA Appeal No. 87-13 (1989). The Judicial Officer held that the guidance documents were not
mandatory and that the EPA regional office must justify its action on its own merits.
315. The most significant pattern of interaction involves federal agency insistence upon obser-
vance of the nonlegislative document as a condition of channelling money to the states, or through
the states to private parties. See, eg., Ohio Dep't of Human Servs. v. Department of Health &
Human Servs., 862 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1988); Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 235-36 (D.C. Cir.
1982) ("Unemployment insurance in this nation is a joint federal-state responsibility .... The De-
partment of Labor informs state agencies of the minimum federal requirements they must meet to
remain certified primarily by issuing Unemployment Insurance Program Letters."); Batterton v.
Marshall, 648 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Food Stamp Program Policy Memo 90-6, HUD Payments,
issued by Thomas O'Connor, Director, Program Development Division (Feb. 9, 1990); Example D-
7, supra text accompanying notes 259-68 (guaranteed student loan program); see also Levesque v.
Block, 723 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1983); Tyler v. Department of Labor, 752 F. Supp. 32 (D. Me. 1990);
infra note 366.
Fletcher v. Housing Auth. of Louisville, 491 F.2d 793 (6th Cir.), vacated sub nom. Department
of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Fletcher, 419 U.S. 812 (1974), offers a sample of this interaction:
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But a brief look at one document strikingly illustrates the way in
which nonlegislative federal guidelines can be translated into commands
to the states and then into commands by the states to private parties.
That document is a typewritten set of guidelines issued by a regional
office of the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), which administers the En-
dangered Species Act.316 The guidelines317 aim at protecting the north-
ern spotted owl by restricting the cutting of timber in the vicinity of its
habitat.318 This species of owl, which is found only in Washington, Ore-
gon, and California, was listed as a "threatened species" effective July 23,
1990, 3 19 and the Guidelines were announced that month by FWS's re-
gional office in Portland, Oregon.
Under the Act, a species is "endangered" when it is "in danger of
extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range, ' 320 and is
"threatened" when it is "likely to become an endangered species within
the foreseeable future. ' 321 It is unlawful to "take" any creature listed as
HUD argues that its Circular merely suggested that local housing agencies consider
implementing a rent range scheme. For us to accept this argument as a reason for not
reviewing HAL's [Housing Authority of Louisville's] rent range formula would be to blind
ourselves to the realities of cooperative federalism in this case. The record is clear that the
sole reason for HAL's implementation of HUD Circular No. 7465.12 was the desire to
conform to HUD's wishes. HUD's desire may not have taken the form of a formal require-
ment .... But it took the form of a demand through HUD's controls over HAL's federal
funding ....
... [lit is clear that HUD's actions made Circular No. 7465.12 a matter of federal
policy, not federal suggestion.
Id at 799.
Other significant categories of federal-state interaction in which federal nonlegislative docu-
ments play a role include those where financial conditions are not central to the issue arising under
the state's administration of the federal statutory program, e.g., Example B-10, supra text accompa-
nying notes 205-11 (Kentucky state implementation plan under Clean Air Act), Example B-11,
supra text accompanying notes 212-28 (state-granted permits to be invalidated by EPA if state fails
to use "top-down" method of determining best available control technology); those in which federal
liabilities are placed upon the state as an actor or upon the relevant state officials in their personal
capacities, see discussion of the restrictions on harvesting of timber near habitats of northern spotted
owls, infra text accompanying notes 316-47; and those in which the states adopt the federal guidance
into their own law, see infra text accompanying notes 316-47.
316. Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
317. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Region 1, Procedures Leading to Endangered Species Act
Compliance for the Northern Spotted Owl (July 1990) [hereinafter Guidelines].
318. The statute provides specifically that "section 553 of title 5 (relating to rulemaking proce-
dures), shall apply to any regulation promulgated to carry out the purposes of this [Act]," with two
exceptions requiring more elaborate notice-and-comment procedures for certain actions, including
the listing of a species as endangered or threatened. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(4)-(6) (1988). The Guide-
lines were issued without observing these procedures.
319. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1991).
320. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
321. Id. § 1532(20).
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an endangered species.322 In a bold application of the authorizing stat-
ute,323 the Department of the Interior has provided by regulation that all
prohibitions pertaining to endangered species shall apply to all
threatened species.324 Thus, "taking" a threatened species like the spot-
ted owl is subject to the same sanctions as is taking an endangered spe-
cies. These include civil penalties, criminal fines and imprisonment, and
federal and citizen suits for injunctive relief.325 The listing of the north-
ern spotted owl as a threatened species immediately placed logging com-
panies, acting in the normal course of their business on private lands, at
risk of prosecution for injury to an owl or to its habitat.
The extent to which unintentional injury to a bird or disturbance of
habitat amounts to a "taking" is highly unclear.326 The term "take" in-
cludes "harm, ' 327 which is defined by regulation to "include significant
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including
breeding, feeding or sheltering." 328 In the absence of designation of a
"critical habitat" pursuant to an elaborate statutory procedure, 329 no
other statutory or regulatory provision expressly prohibits habitat modi-
fication. Modification that results in impairment of essential behavior
322. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
323. "The Secretary may by regulation prohibit with respect to any threatened species any act
prohibited under section 1538(a)(1) of this title, in the case of fish or wildlife ... ." Id. § 1533(d).
324. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (1991). There are some exceptions which are not pertinent here. See id.
§ 17.21(c)(5).
325. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a), (b), (e)(6), (g).
326. The Guidelines use the term "incidental take," which they describe as a" 'take' (as defined
by the Endangered Species Act) that occurs incidentally to otherwise lawful activities. An obvious
example of incidental take would be unknowingly cutting a tree which contained an owl nest with
eggs or young." Guidelines, supra note 317, at 2. This should be read with the regulatory definition
that "[i]ncidental taking means any taking otherwise prohibited, if such taking is incidental to, and
not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1991).
Although the statute provides for a permit to exempt taking that is "incidental to, and not the
purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity," 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B), that proce-
dure is slow and cumbersome, entailing submission of a large-area conservation plan; as a result, few
such permits have been sought or granted. Here, timber operators were confronted with immediate
jeopardy from the moment the spotted owl was designated as threatened. Where there is no permit,
the Guidelines treat any incidental take of the owl as prohibited activity unless the restrictions on
cutting within the stated areas around owl nests and activity centers have been observed. Guide-
lines, supra note 317, at 9-11. The document states that specific information about well-studied
individual owls could be used to justify an exception to the guidelines, but provides no procedure for
doing so. Id. at 10.
327. "The term 'take' means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
328. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.
329. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A). Such a designation for the northern spotted owl, which would
not cover any private lands, is in the proposal stage. See generally U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service,
Region I, News Release, Revised Northern Spotted Owl Critical Habitat Proposal of8.2 Million Acres
Announced by Fish and Wildlife Service (Aug. 5, 1991) [hereinafter News Release].
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patterns that could lead to extinction may be treated as "harm," even if
the extinction might not occur for several decades.330 Beyond that, one
cannot confidently state the extent to which the prohibition of "take"
may require maintenance of habitat necessary for essential behavioral
patterns. The owl Guidelines bear upon this uncertain area.
The Guidelines were intended, at least in part, to advise timber op-
erators about what they could safely do. 331 The document can be viewed
in this aspect as a safe harbor rule.332 But it also discloses an intent to
bind affected parties by authoritatively defining the offense 333-that is,
not only to set safe harbor limits but to treat persons as in violation of the
Endangered Species Act if they go beyond those limits. 334 Thus, to be
safe from prosecution, operators must refrain from cutting timber,
around each owl nest site or activity center, in an area which may be as
large as 3,960 acres.335
330. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986),
aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
331. Telephone Interview with Russell D. Peterson, Field Supervisor, Fish and Wildlife Service
Enhancement Field Office, Portland, Oregon (Aug. 8, 1991). The Guidelines state: "If a person
engaged in timber harvest can demonstrate that these guidelines were followed, the Service does not
intend to seek prosecution in the unlikely event that incidental take occurs in spite of implementing
the guidelines." Guidelines, supra note 317, at 9.
332. See supra text accompanying note 163 (discussing possibility of employing a safe-harbor
policy).
333. See supra text accompanying notes 161-63 (discussing possibility that the agency intends
authoritatively to define the offense).
334. "The Service gives notice that any incidental take of northern spotted owls that results from
activities carried out in a manner inconsistent with the guidelines (and not authorized under the
provisions of Section 7 or Section 10 of the Act) will be subject to investigation by the Service
pursuant to Section 9 of the Act." Guidelines, supra note 317, at 9.
The Guidelines at several points use language suggesting that they are tentative (e.g., "these
interim guidelines," id.) or constitute merely guidance rather than strict rules (e.g., "The Service
offers the following general guidance to address 'incidental' take of northern spotted owls that may
occur incidentally to timber harvest or related activities," id.). Whether intended to be binding or
not, the Guidelines nevertheless have had binding practical effect, in that the affected states and
private operators have had to act upon the reasonable belief that the Guideline rules must be ob-
served. See supra text accompanying notes 79-88; see also infra notes 337-46 and accompanying text
(describing the practical binding nature of a Fish and Wildlife Service August 1991 news release).
The Guidelines' mention that individual situations will be considered relates, not to changing their
policy, but to justifying "an exception to these Guidelines." Guidelines, supra note 317, at 9.
335. Guidelines, supra note 317, at 10-I1. Specifically, the rules call for 1) conducting owl
surveys in accordance with FWS protocols; 2) avoiding harvest that results in less than 70 acres of
"the best available suitable owl habitat" encompassing the nest site and/or activity center of a pair of
spotted owls; 3) avoiding harvest that results in less than 500 acres of "suitable habitat" within a 0.7
mile radius (1,000 acres) of a nest site and/or activity center; and 4) avoiding harvest that results in
less than a 40% coverage by "suitable owl habitat" within a circle centered on the nest or activity
center, having a radius appropriate for its geographical "province." In Washington, the radius for
the Olympic Peninsula is 2.2 miles, which amounts to 9,900 acres, 40% of which is 3,960 acres; for
the Cascades, the radius is 1.8 miles, amounting to 6,600 acres, 40% of which is 2,640 acres. For
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These rules have excited great controversy and bitter outcry about
the loss of jobs and productive opportunities. Part of this has resulted
from application of the Guidelines to logging on federal lands.336 But
complaint has focused as well upon the limits the Guidelines have placed
upon logging on private lands, particularly through administration of the
Guidelines limits by the states.
The State of Washington has adopted the Guidelines standards, sub-
stantially whole, into the administration of its state forest practices
laws. 337 This has resulted in a state requirement that the Guidelines lim-
its be adhered to as a condition of receiving a state permit to cut timber,
even on one's own land.338 Washington has enforced the Guidelines
provinces in Oregon and California, the 40% areas protected against logging are either 1,000 or
1,360 acres in extent. Id.
336. With regard to the closely related action of proposing designation of a critical habitat for
the spotted owl, mostly on federal lands:
[T]imber industry and labor officials immediately accused the agency of being too generous
to the owl at the expense of loggers. American Forest Resources Alliance director Mark
Rey said more than 130,000 workers would lose their jobs because of the government's
action, which he described as a "land lockup equivalent [to the size] of Massachusetts,
Vermont and Connecticut combined."
Margaret E. Kriz, Owls 1, Timber 0, NAT'L J., May 4, 1991, at 1056, 1059 (alteration in original);
see also Margaret E. Kriz, Jobs v. Owls NAT'L J., Nov. 30, 1991, at 2913.
337. See Forest Practices Act, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 76.09-76.09.935 (West Supp. 1992).
Harvesting on lands known to contain a pair or the nest or breeding grounds of any threatened or
endangered species is classified as a "Class IV - special" forest practice, for which special application
and permit requirements must be observed. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-16-050(l)(b)(i) (1989).
The examples herein will be confined to Washington, but the situation is similar in California.
Oregon requires no permit for the harvesting of timber as such. The requirements of the federal
Guidelines, of course, apply directly to timber operators there, as they do in Washington and Cali-
fornia where, additionally, compliance with the Guidelines' requirements is a condition of receiving
state forest practices permits for harvesting timber. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 653p (West 1988)
("The violation of any federal regulations adopted pursuant to the [Endangered Species Act] shall
also be deemed a violation of this section and shall be prosecuted by the appropriate state or local
officials.").
338. "Based on listing of the northern spotted owl as a federal threatened species and the [Owl
Guidelines] provided by the USF&WS, the DNR [Department of Natural Resources] has deter-
mined that the following actions and conditioning criteria on forest practices are necessary to pre-
vent material damage to this public resource." Memorandum from Arden Olson, Division Manager,
Forest Regulation and Assistance Division, Washington State Department of Natural Resources, to
Regional Managers, Owl Memo #2-Interim Operating Procedures for FPA Conditioning to Protect
Northern Spotted Owls 1 (Aug. 27, 1990) (on file with author). For passing upon proposed forest
practice activities (such as cutting trees), the document provided criteria that are very similar to, and
in important respects substantially identical to, those of the Guidelines. For example:
NO HARVEST WILL BE ALLOWED WITHIN THIS CIRCLE [having a radius of 2.2
or 1.8 miles, as prescribed by the Guidelines] THAT RESULTS IN LESS THAN 40%
COVERAGE BY SUITABLE OWL HABITAT: 3972 ACRES ON THE OLYMPIC PE-
NINSULA, 2523 ACRES IN THE CASCADES. If the amount of suitable habitat within
this circle is less than the indicated minimum acreage, no harvest of suitable habitat will be
permitted.
Id. at 4-5. Similar provision is made for protection of 70 acres of the best habitat, and of 500 acres
within a radius of 0.7 miles. Id. at 5.
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limits by means of stop-work orders and permit denials. The following
are two examples.
In December, 1990, the Department of Natural Resources ordered
Wind River Logging to "STOP ALL WORK" connected with the viola-
tion described in the order, and more specifically ordered:
EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY CEASE ALL TIMBER FALLING
ON THOSE PORTIONS OF THE APPLICATION WITHIN OWL
HABITAT, AS INDICATED ON THE ATTACHED MAP. NO
FUTURE TIMBER FALLING WILL BE ALLOWED UNTIL AP-
PROPRIATE SPOTTED OWL SURVEY INFORMATION IS AN-
ALYZED AND ACCEPTED BY THE WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF WILDLIFE AS PROOF OF THE ABSENCE
OF NORHTHERN [sic] SPOTTED OWLS IN THIS
LOCATION.339
The explanation, after paraphrasing federal definitions of "take" and
"harm," stated, in terms reflecting the Guidelines: "THIS OPERA-
TION IS WITHIN (1.8) MILES OF A KNOWN SPOTTED OWL
NEST OR BREEDING PAIR AND WILL REDUCE AVAILABLE
SUITABLE HABITAT BELOW THE LEVEL NECESSARY FOR
THE SURVIVAL OF THE PAIR. ' '340
A permit denial involved Betty F. Orem, whose timberland abutting
the Olympic National Forest had been classified as a tree farm.
In May and June of 1989, while carrying out clearcutting operations in
the neighboring National Forest, the Forest Service burned and other-
wise damaged a number of Mrs. Orem's trees. In considering her sub-
sequent compensation claim, the Forest Service advised Mrs. Orem
that she had a duty to mitigate the damage by harvesting and selling
the damaged trees for their salvage value. When she sought approval
to conduct salvage operations and otherwise to maintain the value of
her timber stand by routine thinning, however, Mrs. Orem's applica-
tion was delayed and then substantially denied due to the presence of a
In some contrast to Owl Memo #2, a successor document, Memorandum from Art Stearns,
Supervisor, Washington State Department of Natural Resources, to Regional Managers, Owl Memo
#3-Interm Policy and Procedures for Protecting the Northern Spotted Owl (Mar. 5, 1991), contains
passages that stress the independent regulatory role of the state, id. at 1 ("Additional spotted owl
protection requirements may be established or imposed as a matter of federal law, over which the
DNR has no regulatory authority."), and the flexible nature of the revised rules, id. ("These are
guidelines only and may be adjusted on a case-by-case basis based on site-specific information and
consultation .... ). In some respects, it has recast the rules in less severely mandatory terms; for
example, the provision corresponding to that quoted in the last paragraph now reads: "HARVEST
WITHIN THIS CIRCLE RESULTING IN LESS THAN 40 PERCENT COVERAGE BY SUIT-
ABLE OWL HABITAT (3,972 ACRES ON THE OLYMPIC PENINSULA AND 2,523 ACRES
ELSEWHERE), MAY HAVE A PROBABLE SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE IMPACT TO THE
OWLS." Id. at 3. But it has retained the basic structure from the Guidelines. See id. at 3-4.
339. Forest Practices Order/Notice from the Washington State Department of Natural Re-
sources to Wind River Logging Company (Dec. 14, 1990) (on file with author).
340. Id.
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spotted owl in the Olympic National Forest, about half a mile from her
property.
3 4 1
The FWS in August 1991 "praised the incorporation into state for-
est practices review processes of Federal guidelines on avoidance of 'inci-
dental taking' of spotted owls on private lands by California and
Washington. ' 342 But this action by the states can hardly be viewed as
voluntary. They and their relevant employees were placed under a plain
threat by the federal agency. States and their officers, employees, agents,
departments and instrumentalities are "persons" within the Endangered
Species Act's definition, 343 and therefore fall within the Act's prohibition
of "take" by "any person."'344 Their approval of timber harvesting activi-
ties that resulted in "take" under the Guidelines could render them liable
on a complicity theory:
Timber harvest on State and private lands may result in the incidental
take of northern spotted owls. Because the States authorize private
timber harvest, they may be party to take on private lands, as well as
on State lands. In the absence of an incidental take permit, this take
would be a violation of the ESA.345
To avoid liability, the states have had to assure that their review and
permitting processes do not allow activities that would violate the Guide-
lines. In this way, the federal agency has in practical effect bound the
states to follow the Guidelines. Further, it has conscripted the states as
its regulatory agents, to force the nonlegislatively promulgated Guide-
lines upon private parties.3 46
In October 1991 the Fish and Wildlife Service rescinded the Guide-
lines, and stated that it "will investigate the need for a regulation. '3 47
341. Complaint at 6, Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Turner, No.
91-2218 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 30, 1991).
342. News Release, supra note 329, at 2.
343. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1988).
344. Id. § 1538(a)(1).
345. Guidelines, supra note 317, at 13 (emphasis added).
346. As was contemporaneously reported:
Agency officials said the guidelines were always meant to be strictly voluntary, but Brian
Boyle, Washington state commissioner of public lands, said Wednesday such a claim was
"insane" and officials in all three states had used the guidelines to design their own owl
protection plans.... Boyle said that even if the guidelines were meant to be voluntary or
advisory, Fish and Wildlife Service officials had made it clear his office would be held
legally responsible if it didn't take steps to guard against the incidental "taking" or killing
of owls. "Everyone felt they had a gun to their heads," Boyle said. "Most landowners,
including my office, had assumed the guidelines had the effect of law."
Les Blumenthal, Agency Rescinds Owl Guidelines, THE OREGONIAN, Oct. 17, 1991, at Bl.
347. Memorandum from H. Dale Hall, Assistant Regional Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice, Region 1, to Field Supervisors (Oct. 2, 1991). The body of this document, in its entirety, reads:
"The July 1990 document titled 'Procedures Leading to Endangered Species Act Compliance for the
Northern Spotted Owl,' is hereby rescinded. We will investigate the need for a regulation." Id.
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Again, our concern is with substantive agency pronouncements that
fit the APA's broad definition of "rule" 348 and that as a practical matter
are binding because they either are intended to bind or are given that
effect. As demonstrated, 349 any such pronouncement (other than one
that interprets specific statutory or regulatory language) must be promul-
gated in accordance with the procedures required by the APA for legisla-
tive rulemaking.350
Described above,351 however, are numerous examples of such policy
documents that were not issued legislatively but that should have been so
issued because as a practical matter they were binding. 35 2
In such cases, affected persons and the public generally will not have
been accorded a regularized notice of the agencies' actions or an assured
opportunity to participate in their development. Citizens or lawyers in
Pocatello, or even in Washington, sometimes do not have ready access to
the guidances or manuals that agencies are using to bind them. And
when they do, they can be confused about the legal import of documents
like these, and frustrated at their inability to escape the practical obliga-
tions or standards the documents impose. Often, in order to win a
needed approval, they must accept the conditions demanded by the non-
legislative rule, and thereby as a practical matter surrender the opportu-
nity to obtain court review of the offending conditions. The agencies, for
their part, might not have issued these pronouncements so freely if legis-
lative rulemaking procedures had had to be followed.
To induce agency observance of proper rulemaking procedures, it is
not efficient to rely upon judicial review, which is uncertain and spas-
modic and at best a belated curative. It would seem much more produc-
tive to set forth for the agencies a clear and comprehensive statement of
the precepts they should obey.
Agencies have available to them two courses of procedural action by
which to banish the vexing problems described in this Article. They may
issue their new policies in binding form through the use of legislative
rulemaking procedures (Recommendations A, C and D below). Or they
may issue them nonlegislatively, and take care to treat them as nonbind-
ing (Recommendation B below).
348. For examples, see supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
349. See supra Parts I, II, and IV.
350. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988). Exceptions to the requirements of § 553 are discussed supra notes
50-55 and accompanying text.
351. See supra Part III.
352. See supra Part II. These pronouncements were not legally binding, of course, because they
had not been issued through the APA's legislative rulemaking procedures.
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A. Accordingly, this Article recommends that agencies adhere to
section 553's legislative notice-and-comment procedures for any substan-
tive statement of general applicability (other than an interpretive rule)
that (a) is intended to establish mandatory standards or to impose obliga-
tions upon private parties, or (b) is given that effect by the agency.35 3 In
the limited circumstances in which such rulemaking may be exempted
from notice-and-comment requirements, 354 agencies should nevertheless
observe the procedures whenever it is feasible and appropriate to do
SO. 3 5 5
Values served by the legislative rulemaking procedures are large
ones. 356 Fairness is furthered by giving notice to those who are to be
bound, both when the proposed rule is about to be considered and when
the final rule is definitively published. The accuracy and thoroughness of
an agency's actions are enhanced by the requirement that it invite and
consider the comments of all the world, including those of directly af-
fected persons who are able, often uniquely, to supply pertinent informa-
tion and analysis. The acceptability and therefore the effectiveness of a
final rule are elevated by the openness of the procedures through which it
has been deliberated and by the public's sense of useful participation in a
process that affects them. Its legitimacy rests upon all of these considera-
tions, as well as upon the foundational fact that the agency has observed
the procedures laid down by Congress for establishing rules with the
353. This recommendation does not apply to interpretive rules-that is, statements that interpret
language of a statute or of an existing legislative rule that has some tangible content. See infra text
accompanying notes 364-73.
354. Substantive issuances exempted from the required procedures by 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1988)
are those involving military or foreign affairs functions, agency management or personnel, public
property, loans, benefits or contracts. To the extent agencies have voluntarily waived these exemp-
tions, however, the procedures specified by § 553 apply mandatorily. Linoz v. Heckler, 800 F.2d
871, 877 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986) (HHS); Rodway v. Department of Agric., 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Lee v. Kemp, 731 F. Supp. 1101, 1112-13 (D.D.C. 1989) (HUD). The rulemaking of particu-
lar agencies or programs may be exempted from the APA requirements by the agencies' governing
statutes.
355. See Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation No. 69-8, Elimina-
tion of Certain Exemptions from the APA Rulemaking Requirements, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-8 (1992);
Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation No. 73-5, Elimination of the
"Military or Foreign Affairs Function" Exemption from APA Rulemaking Requirements, I C.F.R.
§ 305.73-5 (1992); Bonfield, supra note 12; Arthur E. Bonfield, Military and Foreign Affairs Function
Rulemaking Under the APA, 71 MICH. L. Rav. 221 (1972). In all situations, where the use of
notice-and-comment procedures would cause extraordinary difficulties for the agency, it may dis-
pense with those procedures under the "good cause" exception. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B), (c)(3)
(1988); supra note 12.
356. An excellent summary and discussion of the benefits and costs of notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures is presented in Asimow, supra note 50, at 402-09.
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binding force of law. The agency's accountability for its rules is deep-
ened by the court-made requirement of a reasoned explanation based
upon a substantial rulemaking record.357
Beyond all of this, the APA rulemaking requirements impose a salu-
tary discipline. That discipline deters casual and sloppy action, and
thereby forestalls the confusion and needless litigation that can result
from such action. And that discipline reduces tendencies toward over-
regulation or bureaucratic overreaching, and discourages low-profile at-
tempts to create practically-binding norms that Congress or the
Administration would not have approved. 358
B. Even where an agency does not plan to observe these APA pro-
cedures, but instead contemplates a nonlegislative issuance, there is a
way it can preserve its fulfillment of the values just discussed. Indeed,
this is the fashion in which an agency must issue any policy state-
ment 3 -59-that is, any substantive nonlegislative statement that does not
interpret specific statutory or regulatory language.360 The agency must
intend that the statement will be genuinely tentative, rather than binding,
and assure that it will be so treated.361
Accordingly, whenever practicable to do so, agencies should forth-
rightly declare in their nonlegislative policy documents that the stated
policies are tentative, and that before they are applied finally to affected
persons those persons will have a chance to challenge the policies (in the
manner described below). Additionally, agencies should establish sys-
tems to assure that agency staff, counsel, administrative law judges, rele-
vant state officials, and others who may apply policy statements or advise
on the basis of such statements, are made aware that the policies set forth
in such documents are tentative, and are subject to challenge in the man-
ner described below, before they are applied. The agency similarly
should make clear to affected private parties, by specific written advice at
the time an application is made or at the commencement of enforcement
or other proceedings, that the policies set forth in relevant nonlegislative
documents are tentative and are subject to challenge before they are fi-
nally applied.362
357. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
358. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1303, 1309 (7th Cir. 1983).
359. See supra Part V.
360. See supra Part I(C).
361. "A general statement of policy is ... neither a rule nor a precedent but is merely an an-
nouncement to the public of the policy which the agency hopes to implement in future rulemakings
or adjudications." Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
362. If, as is often said, the purpose of the Miranda warning is as much to remind the police
officer as it is to advise the suspect, so the agency staff official's duty to advise the private party
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Then, before it applies a policy statement as herein defined363 to a
private party in a final action, the agency should afford the affected party
a fair opportunity to challenge the legality or wisdom of the statement, or
to suggest that a different policy be adopted in its stead, in a forum that
assures adequate presentation of the affected person's positions and con-
sideration of those positions by agency officials possessing authority to
take or recommend final action upon them. (The opportunity merely to
challenge the applicability of the policy, or to request waivers or excep-
tions from it, would not satisfy this standard.) Those agency officials
should reconsider the policy afresh, in the light of the positions so ad-
vanced by the private party, with an open mind and without allowing
prior publication of the policy statement in any way to foreclose the
issue.
C. By contrast, interpretive rules-those that interpret language of
a statute or of an existing legislative rule that has some tangible con-
tent36-are required by law neither to be promulgated by notice-and-
comment rulemaking processes (as are binding noninterpretive rules) nor
to be issued tentatively while the agency maintains an open mind (as are
policy statements)3 65 This holds true when the interpretation is issued
merely to reduce uncertainty about the meaning of the statute and to
afford guidance to staff and to the public. It remains true even when the
agency intends, if it can, to make the interpretation bind affected private
parties-that is, where the agency intends to act upon the interpretation
and relentlessly to compel compliance with it up to the point that a court
orders it to do otherwise. 366 The agency has the responsibility to admin-
ister and enforce the statute, and in order to get on with that job it must
would serve as a valuable reminder of his or her own duty to treat the guidance as tentative and
subject to policy challenge.
363. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 58-64.
365. See supra note 5. The Department of Agriculture only rarely issues interpretations through
notice-and-comment procedures. Interview with John Golden, Associate General Counsel, USDA,
in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 9, 1991). Concern about adequate notice to affected parties is met by
publication of "notices" without opportunity for comment. Id.
366. See, e.g., Friedrich v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 894 F.2d 829, 837 (6th Cir.)
(interpretive regulation creating no new law, that Secretary required all carriers to abide by, need not
be made through § 553 procedures), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 59 (1990); American Trucking Ass'n v.
United States, 688 F.2d 1337, 1344 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 354 (1984); see also Gray
Panthers Advocacy Comm. v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1284, 1291-92 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Though an agency intends to impose the interpretation bindingly rather than tentatively, and
may do so without undergoing notice-and-comment procedures, it might not succeed in fulfilling
that intention. If the interpretation is not issued legislatively, it is not binding upon courts under the
doctrine of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
the reviewing court must give the agency interpretation respectful attention, but may arrive indepen-
dently at its own interpretation, even if that of the agency is reasonable. Anthony, supra note 6, at
36-40, 55-60. "Such mandatory instructions are not binding on the courts, however, if they merely
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be able to take a position as to the meaning of the statute or regulation it
is interpreting.3 67 By its interpretation, the agency (at least in theory) is
simply applying existing law and not creating new law.3 68 This contrasts
with an agency attempt to establish binding noninterpretive norms, which
as an act of legislation creating new law can be accomplished only
through the APA's legislative rulemaking processes.3 69
It would champion the worthy precepts of the APA, however, if in
certain circumstances agencies would voluntarily make use of notice-
and-comment rulemaking procedures to develop interpretive rules. Im-
plicit in the doctrine that notice-and-comment procedures are not re-
quired for interpretations is a notion that affected parties are in some
sense continuously on notice of any imaginable interpretation, and that it
is their business (or their counsel's) to anticipate and guard against all
possibilities. But when substantial interpretive changes are afoot, the val-
ues of fair notice and public participation and agency accountability de-
mand something better.370
interpret and implement the statute and do not create new law." American Trucking Ass'n, 688 F.2d
at 1344. Thus, despite an agency's intent to bind, interpretive rules do not "foreclose alternate
courses of action [by the agency] or conclusively affect rights of private parties." Batterton v. Mar-
shall, 648 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The staff may unbendingly apply the interpretive docu-
ment within the agency, but a court may set it aside.
367. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
368. See supra cases cited in note 59.
369. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988). "Rules that 'effect a change in existing law or policy,' are subject to
the notice and comment rulemaking requirements of section 553." Mount Diablo Hosp. Dist. v.
Bowen, 860 F.2d 951, 956 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Linoz v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 871, 877 (9th Cir.
1986)); see also supra Part I(B).
370. The Administrative Conference of the United States in 1976 recommended that issuance,
repeal or amendment of an interpretive rule "which is likely to have substantial impact on the pub-
lic" should normally be developed through the procedures of APA § 553; if this is impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest, the agency should so state at the time of promulga-
tion and should ordinarily allow a post-promulgation period for public comment and reconsidera-
tion. Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation No. 76-5, Interpretive
Rules of General Applicability and Statements of General Policy, 1 C.F.R. § 305.76-5 (1992). The
consultant's report on which this recommendation was based was published as Michael Asimow,
Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretative Rules and Policy Statements, 75 MICH, L. Rv.
520 (1977); see also Asimow, supra note 50 (generally reaffirming this position). The American Bar
Association has adopted a resolution with substantially the same effect. American Bar Association,
Summary of Action of the House of Delegates 25 (Annual Meeting Aug. 8-9, 1989).
The proposition that interpretive rules having "substantial impact" are required by § 553 to
observe notice-and-comment procedures has been repeatedly rejected in recent years. See, e.g.,
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 869 F.2d 1526, 1537 (D.C. Cir. 1989); American Postal
Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1100 (1984).
Legislation adopted by Florida in 1991 subjects every "rule" (defined as "each agency statement
of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy," FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 120.52(16) (West Supp. 1992)) to a statutory notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 120.54 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992), with no exemption for interpretive rules or policy
statements, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.535 (West Supp. 1992).
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An agency should endeavor to observe notice-and-comment proce-
dures, I believe, whenever it contemplates the adoption of an interpreta-
tion that would 1) extend the scope of the jurisdiction the agency in fact
exercises; 371 2) alter the obligations or liabilities of private parties;372 or
3) modify the terms on which the agency will grant entitlements. 373  Of
course, the rulemaking procedures need not be considered unless the
The Administrative Conference has adopted a proposal that certain "significant" categories of
rules fitting the APA's exemption for "rules of agency . . . procedureBl or practice," 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(A) (1988), be voluntarily made the subject of notice-and-comment procedures. Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States, Recommendation No. 92-1, The Procedural and Practice
Rule Exemption from the APA Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Requirements (to be codified at 1
C.F.R. § 305.92-1).
371. A proposed interpretation may reach beyond the literal terms of the statute in unexpected
ways, while arguably remaining within the perimeter of the agency's statutory authority. A vivid
example is offered by the memorandum, described supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text, by
which an officer of the Corps of Engineers declared jurisdiction over millions of acres newly identi-
fied as "waters of the United States" connected to interstate commerce on the basis that they were or
could be used as habitat by migratory birds. Although the court in the Tabb Lakes case held the
memorandum was not interpretive and therefore should be set aside for failure to observe § 553
rulemaking procedures, see supra notes 199-200, the memorandum could be regarded as an interpre-
tation of the pertinent regulation, as a similar statement was apparently assumed to be in the Leslie
Salt case. See supra note 200. Notice-and-comment procedures are eminently sensible in such cases.
372. See, eg., Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1307-09 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (interpretation
declaring that stockpiling of reportable quantities of a hazardous substance is a "release," and setting
minimum release levels of radionuclides, was validly issued without notice-and-comment procedures
even if it had effect of creating new duties).
To the extent EPA's top-down policy might have been viewed as an interpretation as to which
notice-and-comment procedures were not required, see supra text accompanying notes 229-32, it
strikingly illustrates the sort of imposition of obligations for which the use of notice-and-comment
procedures is recommended by this Article.
"[A]lthough [the announcement] serves as an interpretation of existing law, it also effectively
enunciates a new requirement heretofore nonexistent for compliance with the law.... If left undis-
turbed by this court, this agency action would wield a significant change in the practices which
private employers must follow and in the enforcement steps the agency must take. Under these
circumstances, I believe that advance notice and opportunity for public participation are vital if a
semblance of democracy is to survive in this regulatory era." Chamber of Commerce of the United
States v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 471-72 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Bazelon, J., concurring).
373. See, e.g., American Postal Workers, 707 F.2d at 548 (changed interpretation of statutory
term reduced retirement annuities of 113,000 prospective retirees).
In 1990 the Department of Agriculture changed its interpretation of an exclusion from the
Food Stamp Act's definition of "income," 7 U.S.C. § 2014(d)(11) (1988), to require that certain
HUD energy assistance payments to publicly-assisted housing tenants, who pay their utilities sepa-
rately, be counted as "income." Food Stamp Program Policy Memo 90-6, supra note 315. If the
HUD payments are made directly to the tenant or to the utility provider, rather than to the landlord,
the amounts are included in the tenant's income. Id. Because eligibility for food stamps is a func-
tion of income, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014, 2017 (1988), the food stamp allowances of tenants directly receiv-
ing the HUD payments are reduced. See West v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 1122, 1129-32 (3d Cir. 1989),
which rejected a substantially identical earlier position taken by USDA. USDA's Food Stamp Pro-
gram Policy Memo 90-6, supra note 315, stated that its "policy applies in all States except those in
the third circuit, i.e. Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey and the Virgin Islands, where there is a
court order that HUD utility payments be excluded as energy assistance payments." Id. at 1.
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change of interpretation is a substantial one, that does not derive in an
obvious way from established norms.
D. A final cluster of recommended practices springs from the
rather obvious proposition that it should be the agency's responsibility to
make the purport of its issuances clear and accessible. 374 If the agency
intends an issuance to be legislative and therefore to be legally binding, it
should say so,375 in order that staff and affected persons will be defini-
tively informed of the agency's intentions. It should also explain specifi-
cally how its issuance has gained legislative status. Ordinary citizens or
even ordinary lawyers should not have to puzzle out the particulars of
the agency's authority or its observance of procedural requirements.376
If the agency expects to apply its document in a binding way, it should be
willing to declare that the rule is a legislative one, and to back up that
claim with a showing of the specific authority and procedures it has ob-
served.377 If these simple declarations were required, the public and the
courts could know that documents issued without them were nonlegisla-
tive, and treat them accordingly.
Thus, this Article recommends that, in issuing any legislative rule,
the agency publish as a part of the document promulgating the rule (a) a
statement that the agency intends the rule to be a legislative rule, with
the force of law; (b) a statement of the way in which specific statutory
provisions confer upon the agency the authority to issue this particular
rule in legislative form;3 78 and (c) a statement of the specific steps the
374. That is the thrust of the APA's publication and public inspection requirements. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a) (1988).
375. Addressing what he termed "interpretative rules with legislative effect," Professor Saun-
ders proposed: "The agency should elect whether it wishes its interpretative rule to enjoy legislative
effect. If the agency so chooses, then it must follow the procedures required of legislative rules."
Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretative Rules with Legislative Effect. An Analysis and a Proposal for
Public Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 373.
376. Assuming the agency has no interest in creating confusion, it can gain nothing by withhold-
ing this information, whereas disclosing it can increase the effectiveness of a rule by leading affected
persons to realize that the rule has the force of law.
377. As the court observed in Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 179-80 (Ist Cir. 1983) (citations
omitted):
Because a rule promulgated pursuant to an agency's legislative authority is entitled to
greater deference by the courts than are interpretative rules or policy statements,... one
runs greater risks in not following legislative rules. It is therefore important to inform the
public at the time of promulgation that a rule is legislative ....
A useful parallel is found in the APA: "Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely
notice of the terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely
affected by, a matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so published." 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1988).
378. The APA's only mention of a rule's statutory authority requires "reference to the legal
authority under which the rule is proposed" to be included in the notice of proposed rulemaking. 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)(2) (1988). Perhaps the requirement in § 553(c), that final rules incorporate "a con-
cise general statement of their basis and purpose," could be read to require mention of statutory
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agency has taken to satisfy the elements of rulemaking procedure
required by 5 U.S.C. § 553 and by any other applicable statutory
provisions. 379
Agencies will protest that the procedures called for by these recom-
mendations will prove bothersome and will place pressures upon their
time and resources. No doubt this is true. Legislative rulemaking proce-
dures can levy upon limited agency funds, people, and other resources.3 80
It must be remembered, though, that agencies exist solely to serve the
public in accordance with the law. The costs of observing the law and
fair procedure are bedrock obligations that cannot legitimately be
slighted simply because an agency might lack adequate resources or pre-
fer to direct them elsewhere. At worst, they are a price to be paid for
lawfulness and openness and accountability in government. The proce-
dures here recommended are in the greatest part required by the law,
which should not be dishonored in the name of a false economy. 381 The
balance of the recommendations-in the spirit of the APA-call for the
agencies to forswear coyness and advise the public candidly of the actions
they are taking. The recommended procedures will avert the imposition
of needless cost and confusion upon the public, and will foster a more
uniform and punctilious process of administration within the agencies.
In short, if an agency wants to bind the public, it should do it right.
It should not try to do it on the cheap or on the sly. It should observe
authority at that stage. See the rules of the Administrative Committee of the Federal Register con-
cerning citations of authority, 1 C.F.R. §§ 21.40-21.53 (1992). Agencies often satisfy these loose
requirements by citing the entirety of a statute, or citing a section number followed by "et seq." In
no place is the agency called upon to state the specific provision that authorizes a rule like the
specific rule at hand to be issued legislatively.
379. The following sample statement illustrates the brevity and simplicity with which the recom-
mendations in the text can be implemented: "This rule is published as a legislative rule and has the
force of law. It is authorized to be issued in legislative form by 72 U.S.C. § 1234, which provides
that 'the Commission may make such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the provi-
sions of this chapter.' Elements of rulemaking procedure required by statute have been complied
with in the following way: Notice of proposed rulemaking for this rule, in compliance with 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(l)-(3), was published in the FederalRegister on [hypothetically] July 25, 1993, 58 Fed. Reg.
34,567. The Notice invited all interested persons to submit written data, views, arguments and com-
ments on the proposed rule, on or before November 1, 1993. The public hearing required by the
Commission's enabling statute, 72 U.S.C. § 1235, was held in Hearing Room 2 in the Commission's
offices at 2120 J Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20000, on October 1, 1993. The statement of the
final rule's basis and purpose, as required by 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), is published herewith."
380. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Michael Asimow, California Underground Regulations, 44 ADMIN. L. REV.
43 (1992). The "good cause" exception to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures is available
where the use of those procedures would be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B), (c)(3) (1988); see supra note 12.
381. If the burdens of lawful rulemaking become so severe that the agency cannot act effectively,
it can seek legislation empowering it to make legislative rules in a less burdensome manner.
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the authorities and procedures laid down by Congress, and it should
make use of some simple procedures to tell the public in a helpful way
what it is doing.
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APPENDIX A
RECOMMENDATION 92-2: AGENCY POLICY STATEMENTS*
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
This recommendation addresses use of agency policy statements.
Policy statements fall within the category of agency actions that are
"rules" within the Administrative Procedure Act's definition because
they constitute "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, inter-
pret, or describe law or policy," 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). "Rules" include (a)
legislative rules, which have been promulgated through use of legislative
rulemaking procedures, usually including the notice-and-comment pro-
cedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553, and (b)
nonlegislative rules-that is, interpretive rules and policy statements-
which fall within the above definition of "rules" but which are not re-
quired to be promulgated through use of legislative rulemaking proce-
dures. Thus, policy statements include all substantive nonlegislative
rules to the extent that they are not limited to interpreting existing law.
They come with a variety of labels and include guidances, guidelines,
manuals, staff instructions, opinion letters, press releases or other infor-
mal captions.
Policy statements that inform agency staff and the public regarding
agency policy are beneficial to both. While they do not have the force of
law (as do legislative rules) and therefore can be challenged within the
agency, they nonetheless are important tools for guiding administration
and enforcement of agency statutes and for advising the public of agency
policy.
The Conference is concerned, however, about situations where agen-
cies issue policy statements which they treat or which are reasonably re-
garded by the public as binding and dispositive of the issues they
address.' The issuance of such binding pronouncements as policy state-
ments does not offer the opportunity for public comment which is nor-
mally afforded during the notice-and-comment legislative rulemaking
process for rules which have the force of law. Courts have frequently
* The Administrative Conference of the United States adopted Recommendation 92-2 on
June 18, 1992. This text is reprinted from an advance copy of the recommendation provided to the
Duke Law Journal by Professor Robert A. Anthony. It will be codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-2. It
has been edited only to conform to the Duke Law Journal's citation conventions.
1. There are many facets that must be assessed in determining whether a policy statement is
operationally a rule that binds affected persons. In general, we apply the concept here to agency
statements that are usually issued in permanent form and that are relied upon by an agency and its
staff to decide policy whose basis, legality, and soundness cannot be challenged within the agency.
Whether a statement is a matter of policy or interpretation, is issued in a permanent form, and is in
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overruled agency reliance on policy statements as binding on affected
persons.
Where the policy statement is treated by the agency as binding, it
operates effectively as a legislative rule but without the notice-and-com-
ment protection of § 553. It may be difficult or impossible for affected
persons to challenge the policy statement within the agency's own deci-
sional process; they may be foreclosed from an opportunity to contend
that the policy statement is unlawful or unwise, or that an alternative
policy should be adopted. Of course, affected persons could undergo the
application of the policy to them, exhaust administrative remedies and
then seek judicial review of agency denials or enforcement actions, at
which time they may find that the policy is given deference by the courts.
The practical consequence is that this process may be costly and pro-
tracted, and that affected parties have neither the opportunity to partici-
pate in the process of policy development nor a realistic opportunity to
challenge the policy when applied within the agency or on judicial re-
view. The public is therefore denied the opportunity to comment and the
agency is denied the educative value of any facts and arguments the party
may have tendered.
The Conference believes this outcome should be avoided, first by
requiring that when an agency contemplates an announcement of sub-
stantive policy (other than through an adjudicative decision), it should
decide whether to issue the policy as a legislative rule, in a form that
binds affected persons, or as a nonbinding policy statement. 2 Second, to
prevent policy statements from being treated as binding as a practical
matter, the recommendation suggests that agencies establish informal
and flexible procedures that allow an opportunity to challenge policy
statements. Recognizing that each agency's process differs, the choice of
which procedures to change in implementing this recommendation re-
mains in the discretion of each agency. Likewise, actions taken during
review of the policy statement would not necessarily be affected by such
reconsideration.
fact binding (or to what extent it is binding) are often difficult questions that can only be decided in
context.
2. The Conference has already urged agencies to use notice-and-comment procedures, where
possible, before promulgating an interpretive rule of general applicability or statement of general
policy that is likely to have substantial impact on the public. Agencies were urged to use post-
promulgation notice-and-comment procedure if it is not practicable to accept and consider com-
ments before the rule is promulgated. See Recommendation 76-5, "Interpretive Rules of General
Applicability and Statements of General Policy," I C.F.R. § 305.76-5.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations applicable to policy statements are
intended to ensure that, before an agency promulgates substantive
policies which bind3 affected persons, it provides appropriate notice and
opportunity for comment on such policies, and makes sure that policy
statements are not treated as binding.
I. Legislative Rulemaking for Binding Policies
A. Agencies should not issue statements of general applicability
that are intended to impose binding substantive standards or obligations
upon affected persons without using legislative rulemaking procedures
(normally including notice-and-comment). Specifically, agencies should
not attempt to bind affected persons through policy statements.
B. When an agency publishes a legislative rule (e.g., in the Federal
Register and in official agency publications), the preamble to the rule
should state that it is a legislative rule intended to bind affected persons.
The preamble should also cite the specific statutory authority for issuing
the rule in binding form as well as the steps that it has taken to comply
with procedural requirements.
II. Policy Statements
A. Notice of Nonbinding Nature. Policy statements of general
applicability should make clear that they are not binding. Persons af-
fected by policy statements should be advised that such policy statements
may be challenged in the manner described in part B below. Agencies
should also ensure, to the extent practicable, that the nonbinding nature
of policy statements is communicated to all persons who apply them or
advise on the basis of them, including agency staff, counsel, administra-
tive law judges, and relevant state officials.
B. Procedures for Challenges to Policy Statements. Agencies that
issue policy statements should examine and, where necessary, change
their formal and informal procedures, where they already exist, to allow
as an additional subject requests for modification or reconsideration of
3. As the term is used here, an agency ruling is "binding" when the agency treats it as a
standard where noncompliance may form an independent basis for action in matters that determine
the rights and obligations of any person outside the agency. This is true whether or not the rule was
promulgated in accordance with § 553. A document that was not issued pursuant to § 553, and
therefore cannot be binding legally, may nevertheless be binding as a practical matter if the agency
treats it as dispositive of the issue it addresses. This recommendation is concerned only with sub-
stantive, as opposed to procedural, rules. See Recommendation 92-1, "The Procedural and Practice
Rule Exemption from the APA Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Requirements" (to be codified at
I C.F.R. § 305.92-1).
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such statements. Agencies should also consider new procedures separate
from the context in which the policy statement is actually applied. The
procedures should not merely consist of an opportunity to challenge the
applicability of the document or to request waivers or exemption from it;
rather, affected persons should be afforded a fair opportunity to challenge
the legality or wisdom of the document and to suggest alternative choices
in an agency forum that assures adequate consideration by responsible
agency officials. The opportunity should take place at or before the time
the policy statement is applied to affected persons unless it is inappropri-
ate or impracticable to do so. Agencies should not allow prior publica-
tion of the statement to foreclose full consideration of the positions being
advanced. When a policy statement is subject to repeated challenges,
agencies should consider instituting legislative rulemaking proceedings
on the policy.
III. Instructions to Agency Staff
This recommendation does not preclude an agency from making a
policy statement which is authoritative for staff officials in the interest of
administrative uniformity or policy coherence. Indeed, agencies are en-
couraged to provide guidance to staff in the form of manuals and other
management directives as a means to regularize employee action that di-
rectly affects the public. However, they should advise staff that while
instructive to them, such policy guidance does not constitute a standard
where noncompliance may form an independent basis for action in mat-
ters that determine the rights and obligations of any person outside the
agency. Further, agencies are encouraged to obtain public comment on
such guidance. Finally, in any case in which staff officials' adherence to
such directives may affect a member of the public, care should be taken
to observe the requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) which imposes a publi-
cation requirement independent of any obligation to employ notice-and-
comment procedures.
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